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ABSTRACT 
Since 2002, Mongolia’s commitment to international peace-support operations has 
dramatically increased and broadened the country’s bilateral and multilateral military 
engagement throughout the world. By participating in UN peacekeeping and other peace-
support operations, Mongolia and its military have gained tremendous experience, 
learned valuable lessons, and identified challenges in several critical areas that needed 
improvement. This thesis argues that Mongolia’s commitment to international peace-
support operations is based on its national interest of survival between two great powers. 
Additionally, that commitment to peace-support operations strengthens Mongolia’s 
position in the world arena and increases its prestige, gaining it international recognition 
from other countries, international organizations, and international security institutions. 
Moreover, active involvement in peace-support operations creates favorable 
conditions for an independent foreign and defense policy and accelerates military 
modernization. Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations influenced the 
acceleration towards modernization and transformation of its military; helping to identify 
the vulnerabilities in old military planning, training, equipment, and acquisition processes 
that desperately required changes. The existing literature on Mongolia’s participation in 
international peace-support operations is very limited. Therefore, this study will 
contribute a deeper and more detailed analysis and assessment of Mongolia’s 
commitment to international peace-support operations for scholars. 
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A. THE MAJOR ISSUE TO BE STUDIED 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist bloc had a great 
impact on the international system, as a multipolar world replaced the formerly bipolar 
world. At the same time, the security environment has changed, as new non-traditional 
threats have increasingly threatened international peace and security, and the complexity 
of conflict has required more commitment from member states. The dynamics of United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have changed as the size, number, and costs of 
operations have increased. These changes in the security environment have affected 
Mongolia’s foreign and defense policies, and there has been a great impact on the 
Mongolian defense sector and its armed forces. 
This thesis will argue that Mongolia’s commitment to international peace-support 
operations is based on its national interest of survival between great powers. That 
commitment strengthens Mongolia’s position in the world arena and increases its 
prestige, gaining it international recognition from great powers, international 
organizations, and international security institutions. Moreover, active involvement in 
peace-support operations creates favorable conditions for independent foreign and 
defense policies and accelerates military modernization. This thesis argues that the 
motivation behind Mongolia’s commitment to international peace-support operations is 
based on its national security policies and military reform needs, not its economic needs. 
The government of Mongolia has been adjusting its foreign and defense policy 
structures to meet the new security challenges of the contemporary world. To strengthen 
bilateral and multilateral military cooperation and secure its military relations with 
neighboring countries, Mongolian defense policy is developing the military into a 
professionally oriented force and participating in UN peacekeeping and other 
international peace-support operations. Since 2002, Mongolia’s commitment to 
international peace-support operations has dramatically increased, and Mongolia has 
broadened its bilateral and multilateral military engagement throughout the world. 
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Mongolia is continually contributing military personnel and gradually increasing its 
participation in international peace-support operations. These have gained Mongolia 
considerable support at both the political and the popular levels,1 in participating in UN 
peacekeeping and other peace-support operations, Mongolia and its military have gained 
tremendous experience, learned valuable lessons, and identified challenges in several 
critical areas that need improvement. This thesis examines the past ten years of 
Mongolia’s commitment to international peace-support operations. 
This thesis seeks to answer two main questions: why has Mongolia chosen to 
participate in international peace-support operations, and what are the current trends. To 
answer these questions, the following sub-questions need to be answered: 1) What are the 
primary motivations behind Mongolia’s commitment to international peace-support 
operations? 2) What is the impact on Mongolian military institutional reform and 
modernization? 3) What is the future vision as to how will improve Mongolia’s existing 
peace-support operations capability? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis has theoretical and empirical importance. Theoretically, this thesis 
helps us understand the security challenges of one small state’s policy and suggests 
viable security options for small states in general. For a small country like Mongolia, 
sandwiched between two giants, security remains a major concern. The findings of this 
study should enhance our understanding of the motivations behind small states’ 
commitment to peace-support operations. Furthermore, this thesis will identify a possible 
way to improve existing peace-support operations capabilities. In addition, it offers 
valuable information about an underdeveloped country working with other international 
partners in order to improve its peace-support operations capability. 
Like Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Romania, Mongolia is one of the 
countries successfully transforming its old communist social and political structure to 
democracy. At the same time, Mongolia is successfully transforming its defense sector, 
                                                 
1 Mendee Jargalsaikhan, Mongolia’s Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and Evolution 
of Field Information Capabilities, (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press, March 
2007), 3. 
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especially its military, through participation in peace-support operations. Mongolia offers 
an important case study for several reasons. It is transitioning to democracy; its 
commitment to international peace-support operations has achieved a significant success 
in quite a short time despite serious challenges; and peace-support operations have 
created favorable conditions for Mongolia’s security environment. Thus Mongolia’s 
commitment offers us lessons in both successes and challenges. 
The existing literature on Mongolia’s participation in international peace-support 
operations is very limited. This study will contribute a deeper and more detailed analysis 
and assessment of Mongolia’s commitment to international peace-support operations for 
scholars and readers. 
The empirical importance of this thesis is to analyze and define the current 
Mongolian foreign and defense policy for participation in international peace-support 
operations, identify the strengths and weaknesses of the armed forces’ peace-support 
operations capability, and suggest how that policy might be modified or altered for 
evolving UN requirements. Furthermore, this study will help predict the future of 
Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations, assess the possibility of modifying 
its strategic view and plans, and identify potential solutions for future involvement and 
capability development. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
To analyze Mongolia’s commitment to international peace-support operations, 
this thesis will examine the following hypotheses. 
First, balance-of-power theory may explain small countries’ policies related to 
participation in peace-support operations, particularly Mongolia’s policy, of protecting its 
national security and sovereignty from immediate neighbors. Small states mostly pursue 
bandwagoning or a balanced relationship with neighbors, seeking strong allies and 
exercising multi-pillar foreign policy in order to survive. In this thesis, I will examine the 
fact that through its participation in international peace operations, Mongolia is pursuing 
a balanced foreign policy, not a bandwagon policy, to ensure its security. Mongolia 
promotes peace-support operations as a means of improving and increasing its position 
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and prestige in the world arena, gaining it recognition from great powers, international 
organizations, and international security institutions. 
The second hypothesis explores how each nation’s commitment to international 
peace-support operations is driven by different motivations and has huge implications for 
a country’s military institutional reform and modernization. States have different 
national, political, and economic motivations for different types of peace-support 
operations. Mongolia’s participation in international is driven by its national security and 
foreign policy priorities and by military institutional reform motivations. I hypothesize 
that the military’s engagement in international peace-support operations ultimately 
improves Mongolia’s capacity to provide its own national security. Participating in 
peace-support operations brings financial benefits for small and developing countries. 
Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan’s participation in peace-support operations have brought 
enormous financial benefits to these countries’ economies. This thesis will argue that 
Mongolia’s participation in peace operations is not mainly driven by economic incentives 
and does not bring financial benefits to its economy. Instead, Mongolia is spending an 
extra amount of money beyond reimbursements received from the UN because its 
participation in international peace-support operations guarantees its national security. 
Third, participating in peace-support operations helps the military survive and 
modernize. Mongolian defense and defense-related laws, policies, and concepts are 
directed to improve its defense capability and seek an appropriate and capable force 
structure while changing the roles of traditional military capabilities to deployment-
oriented operational capabilities. This achievement provides an opportunity for Mongolia 
and its military to increase their peace-support operations capability and acquire new 
capabilities in order to operate more effectively with foreign forces in overseas 
operations, catch up with other foreign militaries, professionalize its personnel, and 
improve civil–military relations. 
Today, Mongolia needs to identify its future involvement in international peace 
operations. This should include sending civilian police mentors, police units, and 
civilians in various political positions in the mission headquarters and UN departments. 
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D. METHOD AND SOURCES 
This thesis is based on a single case study that focuses on Mongolia’s 
participation in international peace-support operations. Using this study, this thesis 
investigates what should be improved and provides critical analysis of Mongolia’s 
current policies related to participation in peace-support operations, as well as the 
prospects for developing further peace-support capability. The analysis in international 
relations will help explain external and internal factors that prompted Mongolia’s 
commitment to international peace and security.   
The existing literature on Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations is 
limited. The main primary sources include Mongolia’s laws, government and agency 
policy papers, publications, publicly available statistical databases, official views, foreign 
and domestic scholarly references, journal articles, journal reports, research papers, 
surveys, and documents from international and nongovernmental organizations. The 
secondary sources include the media, newspapers, and various Internet sources. 
Moreover, I will review the Mongolian Armed Forces deployment records and operation-
completion reports in order to identify applications and lessons learned from past and 
current operations. In this thesis, I will also rely on my own personal experience. From 
2002–2010, I worked in the peace-support operations division of the operations 
directorate of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces (GSMAF) as a staff 
officer and was involved the planning and execution of Mongolia’s participation in 
peace-support operations. 
E. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis will consist of five chapters. Chapter I will present the major issues, 
the research question, its importance, the research methodology, and research tools. The 
second chapter will discuss the evolution of Mongolia’s security environment from post-
Cold War to the present. It will also look at the evolution of Mongolia’s participation in 
three phases: lessons learned, challenges facing Mongolia, and past and future 
participation in peace-support operations. 
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Chapter III will identify the principal motivations behind Mongolia’s active 
participation in peace-support operations. This chapter will focus on external (national 
security and survival) and internal (military institutional reform) motivations. 
Chapter IV identifies the impact of Mongolia’s evolving participation in 
international peace-support operations on its military institutional reform and 
modernization effort. This chapter will especially, focus on Mongolia’s existing peace-
support operations capability and attempt to answer and recommend ways for Mongolia 
to improve existing capability and suitably measure future capability developments. 
Moreover, this chapter will analyze and discuss a possible solution to Mongolia’s future 
involvement in international peace-support operations. 
Chapter V will recapitulate the findings of the previous three chapters and offer 
policy recommendations and a concluding analysis. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF MONGOLIA’S PARTICIPATION IN 
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
Since the end of the Cold War, the security environment in the world has changed 
significantly. These changes have had a wide impact on Mongolia’s security 
environment. As compared to other ex-communist countries, Mongolia is one of the most 
successful at transforming to democracy and a free-market economic system. The 
external and internal changes involved profoundly affected Mongolia’s traditional 
national-security concepts. For a small country like Mongolia, sandwiched between two 
giants, security remains a major concern. The security of small states depends on their 
particular geographical, domestic, and regional environments. Before the end of the Cold 
War, Mongolia’s national security concept was based on a threat-based scenario, the 
“China threat,” and security was managed through a military alliance with the Soviet 
Union. Since its peaceful democratic revolution in 1990, Mongolia’s traditional national-
security approach has changed to a multilateral, neoliberal approach. Mongolia 
recognized that military alliances with either of its two neighbors could not provide a 
favorable security environment in the new globalized world. Therefore, Mongolia chose 
to develop a balanced relationship with these two neighbors while developing a “third-
neighbor policy” and actively participated in regional and international security and 
economic integration. It is impossible to secure Mongolia’s national security without 
cooperating with neighboring and other countries, and actively participating in regional 
and international security activities. 
Mongolia recognized that one of the ways to ensure its security and develop 
peaceful relationships with other countries was to participate in international peace-
support operations. Mongolia’s recent commitment to international peace and security 
produced exceptional prestige for its image in the world and became one of the tools to 
promote national security and implement a multilateral foreign policy, as well as the 
means to develop and transform its military. 
This chapter analyzes how Mongolia’s commitment to international peace-support 
operations evolved through its changing security environments in post-communist times. 
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In addition, the chapter will illustrate past and current participation in peace-support 
operations in three distinct phases and analyze the lessons learned and the challenges. 
A. THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (POST-COLD WAR TO 
THE PRESENT) 
The end of the communist regime totally changed the external and internal 
security environments of Mongolia and led to the quest for newer forms of economic and 
security arrangements.2 From the 1990s, Mongolia, like some other ex-communist 
countries, chose to establish a democratic and humane society with a new constitution 
and political, social, and economic changes, thus starting a new page in Mongolian 
history. Mongolia’s national security has always been directly influenced by external 
factors. Even in today’s era of globalization, it is still questionable and difficult to 
discover the ways that Mongolia can successfully lessen these pressures. 
Historically, Mongolia’s security environment has always been defined by 
external, rather than internal, factors. Mongolia was under the Manchu Empire between 
1691 and1911, gained a short-lived independence between 1911 and 1919, and was 
occupied by the new Republic of China between 1919 and 1921. During these periods, 
the occupiers exercised a ruthless policy in Mongolia. Even during the short period of its 
independence, Mongolia did not actually exercise its own independent national security 
and foreign policy because of external influence from neighboring countries. 
In 1921, Mongolia declared its independence again and established the Mongolian 
People’s Republic. Since then, and until 1990, Mongolia was the first military and 
political ally of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and was a member of the 
communist camp. During the Cold War, this close relationship offered economic 
assistance, and a nuclear and conventional arms umbrella, with the USSR guaranteeing 
Mongolia’s independence and national security.3 In the 1960s–1970s, when the tension 
                                                 
2 Batbayar Tsedendamba, “The Recent Security Developments in The Region: A View from 
Mongolia,” Regional security issues and Mongolia, Vol. 8, (The Institute for Strategic studies, Ulaanbaatar, 
Mongolia), 7. 
3 L.Molomjamts, “Northeast Asia: Mongolia’s Security Interest”, Mongolian Journal of Strategic 
Studies, (The Institute for Strategic studies, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2008), 93. 
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between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) led to military 
confrontation between the two, Mongolia was involved in a double Cold War situation. 
Soviet troops were stationed in Mongolia for long durations because Mongolia’s 
territorial location gave an advantage to the Soviets in their effort to protect their territory 
and use Mongolia as the front line of a possible war with the PRC. In general, during the 
Cold War, the USSR was the only pillar of Mongolia’s security policy, and it had an 
overwhelming influence on Mongolia’s national security and foreign policy decision-
making process. There was no other option for Mongolia. This alliance came to the end 
with the collapse of the USSR. Mongolia’s dependency on the national security and 
foreign policy of another country clearly shows the distorted and uneasy starting point for 
Mongolia’s transition to democracy.4 
National security and territorial and economic independence are the critical 
concerns for every country, as well as for Mongolia. Since 1990, the government of 
Mongolia has been adjusting its national security and foreign and defense policies, 
pursuing a peaceful foreign policy based on its national interests and modifying political 
and economic structures to meet the new security challenges of the contemporary world. 
This policy is defined in its constitution, and the country’s specific external and internal 
situation constitutes the basis for determining its foreign-policy objectives, principles, 
and priorities.5 Through its proactive foreign policy, Mongolia has made unique and 
positive contributions to world security, and actively engaged in world and regional 
political and economic integration efforts and regional security dialogues. 
In 1992, Mongolia adopted a new constitution. Article 10 of “The Constitution of 
Mongolia” states, “Mongolia shall adhere to the universally recognized norms and 
principles of international law, and pursue a peaceful foreign policy”.6 One of 
Mongolia’s foreign-policy objectives is to seek new opportunities, strengthen a good-
                                                 
4 Ibid., 94. 
5 The Concept of Foreign Policy of Mongolia, Available online at: 
http://www.mfat.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=34&Itemid=53&lang=en, 
accessed March 20, 2012. 
6 The Constitution of Mongolia, 1992, article 4.1, Available online at: 
http://www.mongolianembassy.us/government_and_policy/the_constitution_of_mongolia, accessed on 
March 16, 2012. 
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neighbor partnership with its two neighboring countries, and develop friendly 
relationships with other countries.7 “The Concept of National Security of Mongolia,” 
supports this idea and clearly states that Mongolia will seek its national security and 
economic security by diplomatic and political means.8 Also, it states that active support 
of the UN and other international organizations is one of the ways and means to ensure 
the security of the existence of Mongolia.9  
Aiming to achieve its foremost priorities in foreign policy, Mongolia is pursuing a 
more open, balanced foreign- and national-security policy that maintains and develops a 
balanced, long-term, stable, friendly relationship with its two giant neighboring countries, 
while maintaining a multilateral policy.  To secure its existence, Mongolia signed a 
strategic partnership agreement with both neighboring countries. “Based on the universal 
principles of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, non-
aggression, non-interference in internal affairs and peaceful co-existence, these 
agreements laid a legal foundation for the bilateral relations with these two nations”.10 
However, due to recent booming mining industries and mineral discoveries, Russia and 
China are competing for Mongolia’s mineral resources and putting pressure on Mongolia. 
When the Chinese–Russian relationship weakens, the importance of Mongolia to both 
parties increases and other powers’ interest in Mongolia also increases.11 In other words, 
Mongolia could exercise its own independent policy, choose its friends, and successfully 
implement a “third-neighbor” policy. 
The core principle of Mongolia’s “third neighbor” policy is that attracting 
attention from powerful Western countries in order to contain neighboring countries 
                                                 
7 Diplomatic Blue Book, (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2006), 146. 
8 The Concept of National Security of Mongolia, Available online at: 
http://www.mongolianembassy.us/government_and_policy/the _concept_of_national_security#05, 
accessed on March 16, 2012. 
9 Ibid. 
10 “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy”, Official website of Embassy of Mongolia in the U.S., available online 
at: http://www.mongolianembassy.us/government_and_policy/foreign_policy.php, accessed on March 16, 
2012. 
11 Bold Ravdan, The Security of Small State: Option for Mongolia (The Institute for Strategic Studies, 
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2000), 27. 
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creates political and economic pressures that guarantee Mongolia’s independence and 
security, while maintaining a balanced relationship between Russia and China.12 
However, maintaining a balanced relationship with neighbors “does not mean keeping 
equidistance between them or taking identical positions on all issues, but this policy does 
mean strengthening trust and developing all-round good neighborly relations and 
mutually beneficial cooperation with both of them.”13 Within the framework of the “third 
neighbor” policy, Mongolia seeks to diversify its partnerships and promote its relations 
with other countries. The political and economic support of other powerful countries has 
yielded significant contributions to Mongolia’s political and economic development since 
1990. For instance, Mongolia is developing a mutually beneficial partnership with the 
U.S., a country with enormous influence in the world and the region’s security 
environment. Especially, Mongolia’s commitment to the global war on terrorism 
(GWOT) and participation in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars leveraged both countries’ 
military-to-military relationship. Mongolia’s strengthening military cooperation with the 
United States is based on the realities of its national security.14 Overall, through “third 
neighbor” policy, Mongolia is strengthening its position in world political and economic 
affairs and participating in the political and economic integration process in the region.15 
Mongolia will continue to pursue a “third neighbor policy” that balances Russia and 
China and better guarantees an external security environment.16 
Mongolian cooperation with other powerful Western countries and its “third 
neighbor” policy are constrained and endangered by its neighbors. For instance, the U.S. 
Millennium Fund cancelled its investment in a railroad development project because of 
Russian pressure, making Mongolia the loser. Furthermore, due to Russian political 
                                                 
12 Ibid,. 27. 
13 The Concept of National Security of Mongolia, point 27, 2-2. Available online at: 
http://www.mfat.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=35&Itemid=54&lang=en, 
accessed March 20, 2012. 
14 Wang Peiran, “Mongolia’s Delicate Balancing Act”, China Security, Vol.5, no.2, (2009), 24. 
15 Munkhochir Dorjjugder, “Same rules, New Dimensions for Mongolia’s National Security: Adapting 
to the New Geo-Economic Environment”, Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, no. 32, (October 2009), 
available online at: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/10_mongolia_dorjjugder.aspx , accessed 
April 15, 2012. 
16 Ibid. 
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pressure and China’s refusal of military over-flight permission, Mongolia has had to 
cancel its participation in several international and coalition missions and exercises in 
Lebanon, Kosovo, Iraq, and Turkey. It is clear that if China and Russia refuse to open up 
transportation access to Mongolia, all assistance and aid from the world to Mongolia will 
be cut off.17 Moscow and Beijing are carefully observing the U.S.–Mongolian military-
to-military relationship and fear any U.S. military presence in Mongolia, such as a 
possible option for the establishment of military base. These two countries would not 
tolerate Mongolia becoming a military base used to threaten their security.18 However, 
the Mongolian and the U.S. governments have no intent to increase the U.S military 
presence in Mongolia.  
At the same time, while developing a relationship within Western powers, 
Mongolia pays close attention to confidence building among regional countries, 
strengthening its relationship particularly with Northeast Asian countries and increasing 
its involvement in both regional security and economic cooperation and organizations, 
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and Shanghai Security Cooperation. For instance, 
Mongolia is developing and maintaining a friendly relationship with both South and 
North Korea and declares its interest in the peaceful resolution of the Korean peninsula 
crisis.19 In addition, Mongolia has declared itself a nuclear-weapon-free zone and has 
proposed expanding the nuclear-free zone beyond its boundaries throughout Northeast 
Asia.20 This initiative was based on Mongolia’s desire to contribute to regional security; 
Mongolia wants to be an example for other small states in the world.  
Today’s Mongolia’s foreign and national security policy is clearly dominated by a 
need to secure its existence, sovereignty, and economic independence.21 To stay neutral 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 25. 
18 Ibid., 21. 
19 Munkhochir Dorjjugder, “Same rules, New Dimensions for Mongolia’s National Security: Adapting 
to the New Geo-Economic Environment”, Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, (No. 32, October 2009) 
20 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
NPT/Conf.2010/12, (22 March 2010, New York),1. 
21 Sarah Telford, “To What Extend Does Post -1990 Mongolia Pursue an Independent Foreign 
Policy”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, (October 2004), 1. 
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between two neighbors is one of the best options for Mongolia, as well as for any small 
state. Mongolia's geographical position also reinforces this concept. Alicia Campi points 
out “Mongolia’s geographical location between the nuclear powers heavily influences its 
freedom of actions and the scope of its relations with other foreign states”.22 If Mongolia 
fails to balance its multi-pillared policy, there could be a serious impact on its national 
security.23 Mongolia is trying to remain neutral on many security issues in the broader 
context. It makes Mongolia a good place for parties to meet and solve their problems 
without external interference. In addition, Mongolia does not have any intention of 
joining any military alliance organization or signing any binding mutual security 
treaties.24  
There is no argument that the Russian–Chinese relationship continues to affect 
Mongolia’s national interest. Mongolia needs to maintain a beneficial relationship with 
its neighbors—there is no other choice. Munkhochir Dorjjugder asserted that “Mongolia 
has learned a single indelible lesson in terms of national sovereignty and security, that the 
nations should seek balanced, equidistant relations with two neighbors while seeking 
wider recognition and global interaction to the utmost degree”.25 Some literature supports 
his conclusion that the best way to provide national security is for Mongolia to use 
diplomatic and political security measures, such as maintaining balanced relationships 
with Russia and China and continuing to seek a way to establish relationships with other 
powerful countries and implement independent foreign policy.26 
Beginning in the 1990s, Mongolia realized that its “…security can be ensured 
through a collective security system by joint efforts or participation in such a system” and 
                                                 
22 Alicia Campi, “Modern Mongolian-Chinese Strategic Relations: Challenges for the New Century”, 
(February 2004), Available online at: http://usmongoliagroup.com/article_chinese.htm , accessed April 08, 
2012.  
23 Wang Peiran, “Mongolia’s Delicate Balancing Act”, 24. 
24 Munkhochir Dorjjugder, “Same rules, New Dimensions for Mongolia’s National Security: Adapting 
to the New Geo-Economic Environment”, Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, (No. 32, October 2009). 
25 Ibid. 
26 See Bold Ravdan, The Security of Small State: Option for Mongolia, (The Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2000), G. Tumurchuluun, “Security of small states in the eve of the 21st 
century”, Regional security issues and Mongolia, Vol. 7, (The Institute for Strategic studies, Ulaanbaatar, 
Mongolia, 1997). 
 14
that it must “support the activities of the United Nations Organization and other 
international institutions aimed at strengthening world peace and security, and closely 
cooperate with them [in order to create favorable conditions for its national security].”27 
The Government Action Plan states, “The Government shall effectively participate in the 
activities of the United Nations Organization, in an endeavor to fruitfully benefit from the 
potentials of these organizations for guaranteeing national security”.28 The findings of 
this thesis agree that promoting Mongolia’s involvement in international peace and 
security through participation in peace-support operations is the one of the best ways for 
Mongolia to ensure its national interest and security.29  
To understand why participation in peace-support operations has become one of 
the best ways and tools for Mongolia to ensure its national security and national interest 
and implement its proactive foreign policy, this thesis will examine and analyze the 
stages of Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations in the next chapter. 
B. AN OVERVIEW OF MONGOLIA’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE-
SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
United Nations peacekeeping operations evolved in response to a changing 
international political environment,30 from traditional missions to those that incorporate a 
complex, multidimensional frameworks involving military, police, and civilian 
components, including government, businesses, non-governmental organizations and 
non-state actors.31 All peacekeeping operations require significant contributions from UN 
                                                 
27 The Concept of National Security of Mongolia, Available online at: 
http://www.mfat.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=35&Itemid=54&lang=en, 
accessed March 20, 2012. 
28 The Government Action Plan of Mongolia, Available online at: 
http://www.pmis.gov.mn/cabinet/English/index.php, accessed March 16, 2012. (Mongolian transcript). 
29 Ibid., 26. 
30 Michael W. Doyle, “War Making and Peacemaking: The United Nations’ Post Cold War Record”, 
in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, and Pamela Aall, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press), 15. 
31 Adam Roberts, “The United Nations and International Security”, Survival: The IISS Quarterly, 
Vol.35, no.2 (Summer 1993), 12. 
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member nations, who must ensure sufficient resources and capabilities and more 
involvement and systematic planning in the future.32 
Mongolia has directed its military to participate to the greatest extent possible in 
international efforts and its cooperation is designed to strengthen trust in the military 
field.33 The evolution of Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations is all the 
more interesting given the country’s position on matters of national security and the 
implementation of its foreign policy focused on a balanced relationship with neighbors 
and other countries under a non-aligned approach. The Mongolian military recognizes 
and sees the advantages of participation in peace-support operations and sees possibilities 
for improving its capabilities and reforming itself structurally and doctrinally. 
Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations is very recent. Since its 
admission to the UN in 1961, Mongolia never had the chance and opportunity to 
contribute in peace-support operations until 2002. Beginning in 1999, Mongolia’s 
concept of participating in peace-support operations gained considerable support at both 
the political and public levels, and gradually increased.34 As of March 2012, Mongolia 
ranked 67th among 115 UN troop-contributing countries. 35 In addition to its 
participation in UN operations, Mongolia has been a strong partner in the GWOT.  
Mongolia became one of the first 33 countries to support the U.S. after 9/11 and joined 
both Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). 
Understanding the evolution of the Mongolian military’s participation in peace-
support operations is possible by analyzing the development of its participation in the 
three phases: between 1999 and 2003; between 2003 and 2006; and between 2006 and the 
                                                 
32 William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, Moira K. Shanahan, The Brahimi Report and 
the Future of UN Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 5. 
33  The Concept of National Security of Mongolia, Available online at: 
http://www.mfat.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=35&Itemid=54&lang=en, 
accessed March 20, 2012. 
34 Mendee Jargalsaikhan, Mongolia’s Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and 
Evolution of Field Information Capabilities, 3. 
35 “Country contributions list”, Available online at:  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml, accessed on February 
21, 2012.  
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present day. These phases are characterized by unique differences and events that 
occurred at the domestic and international level. There are also aspects in terms of 
lessons learned and challenges faced. 
1. First phase: 1999–2003 
The period from 1999 to 2003 was the first phase of Mongolia’s participation in 
peace-support operations. During this period, the government of Mongolia and its 
military dedicated their efforts to creating the legal foundation for participation in peace-
support operations, training and educating personnel for the brand new missions.  At the 
end of the period, Mongolia had established a firm policy with regard to the use of armed 
forces in peace-support operations. 
Mongolia promulgated a new constitution in 1992. There is no specific language 
in the constitution that allows participation in peace-support operations.  In 1998, the 
“State Great Hural,” adopted “The Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia”. 
According to this policy document, “to carry out functions within the UN Peace-keeping 
forces”36 became one of the primary functions of the Mongolian armed forces in 
peacetime. The following year, Mongolia adopted a decision, so-called “Participating in 
peacekeeping activities” in July 1999. In September 1999, Mongolia signed a 
memorandum of mutual understanding between the Mongolian government and the UN. 
In accordance with these agreements with the UN, Mongolia assumed the responsibility 
of preparing its military personnel, contributing to peace-support operations, and ensuring 
readiness to fulfill its duties as a member state. These steps taken by the Mongolian 
government allowed it to draft and establish a domestic legal foundation for its 
participation in peace-support operations. 
In connection with these documents, the State Great Hural adopted laws that 
regulate its military participation in peace-support operations. The Law of Armed Forces 
(2002) defined “participation in peace-support operations” as one of the primary tasks for 
the Mongolian armed forces, and the Law of Military and Police defines personnel 
                                                 
36 The Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia, 26. 
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participation in the UN peacekeeping and other international operations (2002)37. This 
law also defines and separates the responsibilities of the ministries of defense, foreign 
affairs, and other government agencies. In accordance with these laws, the government 
adopted a series of regulations and procedures that regulate its participation in peace-
support operations.38 All these laws, regulations, and procedures established the legal 
foundation for Mongolian participation in peace-support operations and defined relations 
with respect to management, organization, and preparation for peace-support operations. 
In order to implement relevant laws and regulations, the ministry of defense 
(MOD) and GSMAF created an office in 1999 responsible for the implementation of laws 
and regulations. The main tasks of the office include developing doctrine and concepts 
for participation in peace-support operations; managing, monitoring, and evaluating 
overall deployments; training and preparing personnel and units deploying to missions; 
and collecting, analyzing, and applying lessons learned from overseas operations. Since 
then, this office has expanded and has the main responsibility for facilitating armed 
forces participation in peace-support operations, coordinating and managing all deployed 
operations, maintaining close relationship with the UN and other government agencies, 
and building peace-support operations capabilities. 
Mongolia and its military have taken several actions to accelerate the 
implementation of initiatives involving peace-support operations. In 1997, the Mongolian 
armed forces established a 150th infantry battalion.39 Initially, the primary mission of 
this unit was combat, but was changed to peace support. Two platoons from this unit 
participated in the joint field training exercise CENTERAZBAT-2000 in Kazakhstan and 
the multinational peacekeeping exercise SHANTEE-DOOT in Bangladesh in 2002. 
                                                 
37 In 2010, The State Great Hural was made the amendments to this law and renamed “Participation in 
Peace Support Operations”.  
38 Some of these regulation and procedures are “The procedure of the border and customs service 
inspection for the vehicles and equipment of the foreign units assigned for peacekeeping field exercise in 
Mongolia”(2003), “The procedure on type and quantity of supplies and equipment issued for personnel 
participating in peacekeeping and international missions”(2003). 
39 The Armed Forces unit #150 is established in 1997 and became the first unit that designated for 
peace-support operations. Since then, the Mongolian Armed Forces has established the second unit #330 in 
2008 and the establishment of third designated unit is under the way.   
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Given the new task of preparing for and participating in peace-support operations, 
Mongolia has established and expanded its military-to-military relationship with other 
developed and developing countries, including the U.S., Germany, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom in order to solve logistic and technical problems and educate personnel.  
At the beginning of 1995, Mongolia started to send officers to different countries 
around the world, such as the U.S., Germany, Holland, Canada, Ireland, Switzerland, 
Ireland, Norway, Nepal, and Iran, for UN peacekeeping courses, training, workshops and 
seminars organized by the UN, USPACOM and regional organizations. For instance, 
Mongolian officers attended the PKO symposium in Thailand in 2000, the PKO trainers 
course in Hawaii in 2000, the South Asian PKO seminar-game in Nepal in 2001, and the 
peacekeeping command-post exercise in India in 2003. At the same time, Mongolia sends 
its Armed Forces personnel abroad for professional military education and training. From 
1992 and 2011, Mongolia sent 298 officers and NCOs to the U.S for various kinds of 
military courses, training, schools and colleges.40 
From 1999 and 2003, despite a shortage of experienced and trained personnel, 
Mongolia hosted several joint, bilateral, and multinational training exercises, courses and 
seminars with the UN, U.S., and Belgium. For instance, Mongolia hosted the Northeast 
Asia Peacekeeping Operations seminar-game in 2002, conducted a joint exercise with the 
Belgium Armed Forces in 2003, and, for the first time, conducted the bilateral exercise 
called “Khaan Quest” with the U.S. Armed Forces in September 2003.41 Since then, 
domestically organized training courses and exercises have become an essential part of 
the training and educational system. 
Active participation and new knowledge extracted from overseas and domestic 
training courses and exercises allowed Mongolia to develop new peace support 
operations training program in 2003. In accordance with the program, all armed forces 
units are required to include peace-support operations training in their annual training 
                                                 
40 The statistical data are provided by Human Resource Department of the Ministry of Defense of 
Mongolia.   
41 Initially, “Khaan Quest” exercise was designed for joint exercise of Mongolian Armed Forces and 
the U.S. Armed Forces and annually conducted until 2006. In 2006, this exercise was expanded and 
became one of the top 5 multinational peace-support operations exercises in the region.  
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programs, and the GSMAF is responsible for conducting pre-deployment and specialized 
trainings for deploying units and personnel. At the same time, the peacekeeping 
operations office in the GSMAF started translating peace-support training manuals and 
documents from English to use in training. However, the MAF faced a language barrier: 
they had very few personnel who could understand English. The first English-language 
training laboratory was established in 2002 with assistance from the U.S. 
In 2002, GSMAF drafted a plan for further development of the Five Hills 
Training Center as a National Peace Support Operations Training Center in the short run 
and a regional center in the long run, with assistance from the U.S. and partners. 
Mongolia has tailored its military training base to be a venue for peace-support 
operations for regional militaries to improve interoperability and confidence-building 
among regional nations. 
In August 2002, Mongolia deployed two military observers to the United Nations 
Mission in Congo (MONUC) that marked the first time for the Mongolian Armed Forces 
participation in the UN peacekeeping operations. 
2. Second Phase: 2003–2006 
Between 2003 and 2006, Mongolia’s commitment to peace-support operations 
steadily increased and diversified. Mongolia started participating in coalition operations 
and gradually added personnel to UN peacekeeping operations during this period. 
The first qualitative change in Mongolia’s national security and foreign policy 
came after the horrific terrorist attack on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001. Since 9/11, 
Mongolia has been a strong partner in the GWOT, becoming one of the first among 33 
countries to support U.S. counterterrorism. In March 2003, a U.S-led coalition force 
invaded Iraq and started Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Mongolia was one of the first 
supporters of this operation. In April 2003, the Mongolian government decided to 
participate in the U.S-led coalition operations in Iraq and deployed a light infantry 
company to OIF for missions within the Polish-led multinational division in August. It 
was a remarkable event for Mongolia—the first time it had deployed its troops to 
overseas combat operations since 1945. In addition, it was a tough choice for Mongolia in 
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terms of its security environment, given its location between Russia and China, which are 
potential adversaries of the U.S. However, Mongolia made an independent decision to 
participate in coalition operations, and it paid off. The decision brought controversy at 
home among politicians and the public, but there were few opponents of this 
commitment. Mongolia observed the advantages of it and gained support from the 
highest political levels, including the president, parliament and government. Since 2003, 
Mongolia has deployed 1195 personnel within ten rotations to OIF and withdrew its 
troops in 2008. 
Mongolia deployed an artillery mobile training team to OEF in Afghanistan to 
support the training of the Afghan National Army in October 2003. This still continues. 
In 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush praised the professional ability, endurance and 
courage of Mongolian troops participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom.42 With the 
assistance of the Belgium Defense Force, the Mongolian Armed Forces participated in 
the NATO mission (KFOR) in Kosovo from September 2005 to 2007, deploying 72 
personnel. A Mongolian platoon attached to the BELUX Company in the French battalion 
was Mongolia’s first commitment to peace and stability support for the Balkans and 
NATO missions.43 All these commitments to coalition operations gave unique 
experiences and knowledge to the Mongolian government and military. That knowledge 
was used to prepare a deployment of contingent of troops to the UN peacekeeping 
missions in following years. 
In addition to its impressive participation in coalition operations during this 
period, Mongolia gradually expanded its commitment to UN peacekeeping operations. In 
December 2002, Mongolia sent three officers to the United Nations Mission in the 
Western Sahara (MINURSO) as UN military observers. In 2005, Mongolia sent two 
officers to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). In 2006, one officer deployed 
to the United Nations Mission in Georgia (UNIMIG) and five to the United Nations 
 
                                                 
42 Judy Keen, “Bush cheers Mongolia for pushing democracy”, USA Today, available online at: 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-11-21-bush-mongolia_x.htm , accessed April 18, 2012. 
43 The statistical data are provided by Peace Support Operations division, J3 Operations Directorate, 
The General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces.  
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Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Until its shutdown, two officers served in the 
UNIMIG mission. In addition, ten officers served in the UNMEE mission until its 
shutdown in 2009. 
Besides the deployments to peace-support operations, the Mongolian government 
and its military have focused on expanding their peace-support-operations capability. In 
2005, the second infantry battalion designated for peace-support operations was 
established. Since its active participation in peace-support operations, the government of 
Mongolia has concluded that military reform is crucial for capability development and 
started in 2005 to implement a transformation program called "The Armed Forces 
Development Program through the Year 2015.”44 In the framework of this new program, 
the GSMAF created the “Development of Peace Support Operations Capability of the 
Armed Forces” project, attached to the main project. The main objective is to reform, 
reorganize, modernize, and transform the armed forces through defense resource-
management procedures and create “world-class” peacekeeping forces compatible with 
the United Nations and coalition operations.45 
3. Third Phase: 2006 to the Present 
During this period, Mongolia has gradually expanded its commitment to peace-
support operations, and participation in international peace-support operations has 
become the day-to-day mission of its military. The participation in international peace-
support operations became one of the most successful tools for implementing Mongolia’s 
national security and foreign policy. The uniqueness of this period is characterized by 
two phenomena. On the one hand, Mongolia started to deploy a full-sized infantry 
battalion to UN missions; on the other hand, Mongolia was increasing the number of its 
troops in coalition operations and starting to participate in NATO missions in 
Afghanistan. 
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In January 2006, Mongolia deployed an infantry company consisting of 250 
personnel to UNMIL for protection of the Special Court of Sierra-Leone.  It opened a 
brand new history page in its military and marked the first time that Mongolia had 
deployed contingent-sized troops to UN peacekeeping operations. 2,300 personnel served 
in this mission until it closed in 2010. In November 2009, the Mongolia decided to send 
an advance party of infantry battalion, 264 personnel, to the United Nations mission in 
Chad and CAR (MINURCAT).46 This marked the first time Mongolia deployed such a 
large number of troops (full battalion size) abroad since 1945. Until its shutdown in 2010, 
528 personnel served in this mission. 
At present, there are eight military observers with United Nations missions (four 
in Western Sahara /MINURSO/, two in the Republic of South Sudan /UNMISS/, two 
with the in the Democratic Republic of Congo /MONUSCO/) and eight staff officers (six 
with in South Sudan /UNMISS/, two with the African Union-UN Hybrid Operations in 
Darfur /UNAMID/) serving in the UN missions. 
Moreover, Mongolia has deployed two contingents of 425 personnel in two UN 
peacekeeping missions. Among these, in 2010, a Level II field medical hospital that 
consists of 75 personnel was deployed to the UNAMID mission and is still operating in 
the mission area. Recently, the Mongolian government decided to send a full infantry 
battalion of 850 personnel to the newly established peacekeeping mission in South Sudan 
and an advance party of infantry battalion, 350 personnel, will be deployed to the mission 
area at the end of the April 2012. 
In addition, at the present time, Mongolia has deployed an artillery mobile 
training team of 24 personnel, a helicopter mobile training team of six personnel, and a 
light-infantry company of 126 personnel to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom 
and an infantry platoon of 154 personnel to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. In 2011, 
with the assistance of the Belgium Defense Force, Mongolia deployed a light infantry 
company of 57 personnel for an airfield protection mission of Kabul International 
Airport, under the ISAF command.  
                                                 
46 Under some circumstances, Mongolia is not fully deployed full battalion to this mission and the UN 
closed the MINIRCAT mission in 2010.   
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To sum up, since the first deployment of two military officers as United Nations 
military observers to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2002, as of 03 April 2012, 
Mongolia has deployed 5840 military men and women personnel to eight UN 
peacekeeping missions and four coalition operations, including military observers, staff 
officers and contingent-sized troops.47 
In 2006, Mongolia for the first time hosted the multinational peace-support 
operations exercise “Khaan Quest”. Since then, this exercise has become one of the top 
five multinational exercises in the region. At the same time, Mongolia has hosted 
bilateral exercises with India since 2004, with Russia since 2008, with Qatar since 2008 
and with China since 2009. In 2007 and 2010, Mongolia hosted a “Non-lethal Weapons” 
regional seminar. Since 2004, with assistance from the Center of Civil–Military 
Relations, Monterey, California, and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) fund, 
Mongolia has hosted various peace-support operations courses, including the United 
Nations staff officer course, United Nations military observer course, peace support 
operations instructor course and train-the-trainers course. In addition, Mongolia has 
participated in multinational and bilateral military exercises conducted abroad. They 
include the “Anadolu” multinational special force operations exercise in Turkey (2006), 
“Garuda Shield” multinational peace support operations exercise in Indonesia (2009), 
“Ankhor Sentinel” exercise in Cambodia (2010), and “Ayara Guardian” exercise in 
Thailand (2011). 
C. THE CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED 
1. Challenges 
At the beginning of Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations, 
everything was new and its armed forces had not had any operational experience since 
the end of World War II. Like other troop-contributing countries, Mongolia’s 
commitment to international peace-support operations faces many challenges at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They include challenges at the political and 
                                                 
47 The statistical data are provided by Peace Support Operations division, J3 Operations Directorate, 
The General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces.  
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economic levels and organizational, doctrinal, self-sustainment capability, 
interoperability, and manpower issues. Reliability of major and minor equipment, lack of 
inter-agency cooperation, and lack of language proficiency and proper education are also 
hurdles.48 In order to resolve these immediate challenges, Mongolia has taken deliberate 
steps to develop its peace-support operations capability. It continues to do so. 
At the strategic level, establishing the legal foundation and proper decision-
making process to participate in peace-support operations has been one of the biggest 
challenges for Mongolia. For instance, the decision to participate in the U.S.-led coalition 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the NATO operations in Kosovo challenged 
Mongolia’s leadership because of Mongolia’s external and internal security environment 
always depends on its relationship with immediate neighbors, and they have massive 
influence in the political and economic life of Mongolia. Mongolia needs to show these 
countries that the armed forces transformation and peace-support-operations capability 
development is focused on increasing its reputation in the world and contributing to 
international peace and security.  
At the beginning of its participation, Mongolia’s decision making at the strategic 
level was slow. It still cannot meet today’s requirements, and its fast-growing 
contribution to peace-support operations requires rapid decisions to some degree. Slow 
decision-making processes impede operational planning and preparation. The lack of a 
theoretical basis of the operational doctrine affects operational planning. Mendee 
Jargalsaikhan states that: 
The decision-making procedures for international peacekeeping operations 
have been established in legislation, there are a number of procedural gaps 
that need to be closed.  For instance, specific duties and responsibilities of 
various government agencies have not been clearly defined; therefore, the 
decision-making process becomes an obstacle for military planning and 
preparation.49 
                                                 
48 Bayarmagnai Byambasuren, “Challenges Facing Mongolia’s Participation in Coalition Military 
Operations”, USAWC Strategy Research Project (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks: 2005), 22. 
49 Mendee Jargalsaikhan, Mongolia’s Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and 
Evolution of Field Information Capabilities, 18. 
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UN and coalition operations require a high financial outlay and additional 
financing for training, service, maintenance, and equipment. Mongolia’s self-sustaining  
capability is restricted by its limited economic capability. “Operational funding issues 
need to be well-articulated in order to maintain consistent and adequate financial support 
for pre-deployment and deployment”.50  
One of the most challenging issues is that major and minor equipment does not 
meet rapidly changing operational requirements and UN standards.  Currently, weapon 
systems being used in overseas operations are from the 1970–1980s and not operable 
within other countries’ modern weapons system and equipment used in peace-support 
operations. For instance, based on my experience in Iraq, there are significant gaps 
between the weapons and equipment of Western developed countries and Mongolia’s 
military. Bayarmagnai Byambasuren asserts that, “Mongolian troops are highly skilled on 
that weapon and equipment, [however] they are not interoperable with the rest of the 
coalition members...it is top priority for Mongolia to [be] equip[ed]…with modern 
weapons and equipment that could meet the future peace operations requirements”.51 To 
provide modern weaponry and modernize old weapon systems and equipment will 
remain the most demanding challenge for the Mongolian armed forces. This is observed 
not only on the weapons, equipment and logistic side, also observed in the command and 
control structure, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.  
Interoperability with foreign armed forces in international operations is a 
challenging issue.  Interoperability is a crucial aspect of planning and execution in any 
UN peacekeeping and joint or combined coalition operation, particularly at the 
operational and tactical levels. The disparities in command-and-control structures, 
organization, doctrine, operational concepts and tactics, language, equipment, and 
logistics create vast difficulties in peace-support operations.52 The difference in doctrine, 
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command and control structure, tactics, rules of engagement, equipment, and logistics 
chains creates difficulties in MAFs participation in UN and coalition operations. 
The consequence of the disbandment of the Mongolian military justice system in 
the 1990s created a huge gap in the military legal system. Mendee Jargalsakhan goes on 
to explain this problem: 
Due to the lack of legal expertise, international operations are lead to the 
wrong interpretation of laws and practices related to operations and the 
protection of the personnel. In addition, a shortage of the defense legal 
experts is one of the challenges and lessons learned for Mongolia. Both 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense could prepare a 
team of legal experts in international law, particularly in legal matters 
related to military operations. These matters are particularly acute in 
coalition operations, which are usually established on an ad-hoc basis and 
require extensive knowledge and expertise in international legal matters.53 
A coherent and efficient training and education system for military personnel is 
crucial to mission success, particularly in peace-support operations. This not only applies 
to the military, but also educates the public, especially politicians, and provides a broad 
understanding of peace-support operations. In the case of Mongolia, from the beginning 
of its involvement in peace-support operations, there have not been enough personnel 
who are trained for peace support. Mongolian armed forces personnel have gained 
tremendous experience and knowledge and provided useful insights to the development 
of training and education programs of peace-support operations. However, the Mongolian 
military has not fully integrated and circulated all this knowledge and experience into 
military training and educational institutions, especially at the National Defense 
University, and that remains one of the country’s challenges. 
Language is an important and critical factor for mission success and for operating 
with other multinational forces in peace-support operations. All personnel, especially in 
the command group, are required to understand and communicate with the official 
language of any peace-support operations. Lack of English speakers has contributed to 
some difficulties. Due to misunderstandings between forces deployed to peace-support 
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operations, whole operations might be jeopardized. This language barrier created a vast 
challenge at the beginning of Mongolian deployments to international peace-support 
operations, and Mongolian military is still struggling with it. For instance, each rotation 
that deployed to OIF in Iraq had between eight to twenty English speakers out of the 
hundred to hundred and thirty personnel.54 Due to a shortage of English speaking 
personnel and in order to avoid misunderstanding in operations, Mongolia requested U.S. 
staff embeds to assist Mongolian rotations, and the Alaska National Guard deployed two 
guardsmen with each rotation of Mongolian forces in Iraq.55 I assume that the language 
challenge will remain in the near and mid future. It is necessary to train key officers and 
non-commissioned officers in language courses overseas, which in turn enables them to 
plan and execute military operations in cooperation with other foreign military forces in 
peace-support operations.56 
The UN peacekeeping and coalition operations require each troop-contributing 
country to provide a sufficient number personnel and logistics for their deployed troops. 
After the communist era, the Mongolian military downsized significantly. The 
consequences are that the Mongolian military is facing challenges to fulfill manpower 
needs for peace-support operations designated units and to provide and sustain enough 
manpower for multiple missions. The significant increase in Mongolian military 
participation in peace-support operations in the last five years clearly demonstrated this 
challenge. “Over time, multiple peacekeeping deployments can overload and stress 
critical portions of a military by relying on small numbers of well-trained cadre for repeat 
peacekeeping missions, thus potentially damaging their personal morale and welfare”.57 
Any type of peace-support operation requires from the contributing countries total 
responsibility for their sustainment, logistics support for their deployed personnel, and 
the cost of maintaining troops, particularly in coalition operations. Adequate and 
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sufficient logistical support for troops on the ground is “always of paramount importance 
in this respect”.58 That is the challenge Mongolia has been facing since its participation. 
Due to limited economic and financial resources, Mongolia’s self-sustaining capability is 
restricted, especially while maintaining its troops in coalition operations, and even in 
some UN peacekeeping operations. “Some major funding requirements include pre-
deployment training, procurement of necessary supplies and equipment, troop salaries 
and insurance”.59 I assume that Mongolia will continue to face this sustainment challenge 
in the near and perhaps long-term, until its economy can provide all necessary 
sustainment. 
2. Lessons Learned 
To successfully accomplish its mission and tasks while achieving desired political 
and foreign policy goals and elude further mistakes, a nation-state must learn from the 
experience. Mongolia and its military are still learning from the past and recent 
experiences in peace-support operations. Some of its peacekeeping missions were 
successful, but some faced many difficulties. 
In terms of lessons learned from participation in peace-support operations, there 
are six lessons significant to this thesis: 
First, in general, the Mongolian government and public clearly understand that 
participation in peace-support operations increases Mongolia’s image and prestige in the 
world arena.60 Mongolia fulfills its responsibility to contribute to international peace and 
security, at the same time that, as Mendee Jargalsaikhan asserts, 
The Mongolian government has had an opportunity to examine the 
effectiveness of the procedures, inter-agency committees, and working 
groups established by the relevant concerning legislation for participation 
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in peace support operations, and therefore the opportunity to introduce 
necessary changes and improvements.61 
All peace-support operations must have the support of and get political will from 
other nations, especially in UN peacekeeping operations. The political will of the UNSC 
permanent members or coalition-led nations is most important; however, these nations 
still struggle with their national interests in war-torn areas. Mongolia has learned that 
public support and political will from politicians in ruling and competing political parties 
are important factors that have a vast impact on participation in peace-support operations. 
In addition, before deciding to send any troops abroad, Mongolia needs to consider 
factors vital to its national security and interest. In other words, Mongolia does not need 
to send troops to all peace-support operations conducted throughout the world. This 
assessment is directly connected to the next lesson. 
Second, Mongolia has learned that one of the important factors of successful 
participation in peace-support operations is picking and choosing peace-support 
operations with clearly and precisely worded mandates and tasks that are within the 
capability of the deployed forces to execute. Ambiguous and vague mandates make a 
good mission difficult and a difficult mission impossible to accomplish. One of the 
factors contributing to the success of a mission is the ability to implement a mandate. 
However, there is a “fantastic gap” between the resolutions and the means available to 
military commanders.62 In reality, Mongolia is still struggling with providing sufficient 
capability and ability to its military commanders to implement tasks designated for 
Mongolian troops in peace-support operations, and this has often prevented operational, 
and even overall, mission success. 
Third, for the military, Mongolian armed forces participation in peace-support 
operations has helped the forces evaluate their current force structure, training and 
education institutions, major and minor equipment, and most importantly, readiness of 
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military units.63 When participating in peace-support operations, personnel must maintain 
the highest standards of professional conduct and discipline and be aware of and 
proactively manage their impact on the host country and local communities. In order to 
demonstrate its full capacity in future peace-support operations and fully meet the 
requirement and challenges in complex peace-support operations, Mongolia must 
consider what kind of capabilities will be necessary and develop them. 
Fourth, the ability to successfully implement a mandate and specified tasks also 
will depend on collaboration between government agencies, local public support, and 
support from the international community. Each government and non-government 
organization has its own strengths that fill in the gap and weaknesses of others. Mongolia 
has learned that it must develop close working relationships with all government agencies 
and non-government organizations, be transparent and impartial in its dealings, and 
attract and retain highly qualified personnel for peace-support operations. One of the 
outcomes of the successful achievement of Mongolia’s participation in peace-support 
operations that its civil–military relations have improved significantly. Mongolia has 
learned that civil–military relations must be improved and that close cooperation, shared 
interest and information-sharing between civilian and military bureaucracies are 
important for successful decision-making process in peace-support operations. So far, 
Mongolia has not faced critical civil–military tensions and difficulties in the decision-
making process in issues related to peace-support operations. 
Fifth, Mongolia has learned that peace-support operations require a precise and 
clear command-and-control structure, a sustainable logistic system, adequate operational 
procedures, and robust capabilities. UN peacekeeping operations and coalition operations 
are based on an ad-hoc coalition. No troop-contributing country is willing to delegate 
their national command to the UN. The UN mission in Somalia was a clear example of 
how field commanders lacked command and control of the forces in their area of 
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operations.64 In the case of Mongolia, in the initial phase of its deployment, there was no 
full national command and control. From time to time, at the strategic and operational 
level, Mongolia has learned and established and maintained a clear chain of command 
and control over its troops overseas and, at the tactical level, sometimes delegated its 
national command and control authority to leading nations or organizations. Nonetheless, 
Mongolian peacekeepers are still struggling with a secure a national command-and-
control system and network in both the mission area and homeland. 
Sixth, without adequate financial support for peace-support operations, the 
mission cannot implement its goals. Modern peacekeeping operations are not very cost 
efficient. The Mongolian Government has learned that in order to increase its 
commitment to required peace-support operations, it must allocate sufficient funding for 
training, equipping and sustaining enough forces in peace-support operations.  “Mongolia 
sees that maintaining soldiers in coalition operations is much more difficult than with the 
UN peacekeeping operations”.65 Today’s peace-support operations have become more 
complex. They are shifting their characteristics from traditional peacekeeping to peace 
enforcement. If Mongolia decides to participate in peace-enforcement missions in war-
torn areas,, troops need more sophisticated and protective equipment and that requires 
generous financial support. The current economic boom in Mongolia might allow the 
government to allocate enough financial resources for its participation in peace-support 
operations. 
D. CONCLUSION 
To conclude, during the decade of Mongolia’s participation in peace-support 
operations, its armed forces personnel have consistently demonstrated professionalism, 
outstanding accomplishment of tasks, high spirit, and an ability to fulfill their 
commitments to peace-support operations. Therefore, they have received many 
compliments from the UN, its agencies, nation-states and the local population. In 
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addition, “these commitments provide an opportunity for the Mongolian government to 
contribute to global peace and security in a highly visible way”.66 Mongolia always 
attaches importance to and supports implementation of peacekeeping operations in line 
with the spirit of the UN charter. Mongolia holds that UN peacekeeping operations 
should strictly abide by the purposes and principles of the UN charter, especially those 
basic principles that have proven to be effective in peacekeeping practices. Since the first 
deployment, the Mongolian armed forces have been collecting and analyzing all lessons 
from its experiences in peace-support operations and applying them to future 
commitments. At the same time, Mongolia and its military are identifying and solving 
challenges facing its commitment and developing its peace-support capabilities in order 
to participate and operate with the UN and other military forces more effectively and 
efficiently. 
Mongolia’s changing security environment in the post-communist era enabled and 
encouraged Mongolia to choose to participate in peace-support operations, and 
Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations is distinguished by three distinct 
phases. This analysis will give a broad understanding of the evolution of Mongolia’s 
participation and help to identify the principal motivations for its commitment to peace-
support operations. These motivations are will be explained in detail in the next chapter. 
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III. THE PRINCIPAL MOTIVATIONS BEHIND MONGOLIA’S 
PARTICPATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
According to Article 43 of the UN charter, all member nations have an obligation 
to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.67 Every nation’s 
commitment is very important because of the success of peace-support operations depend 
on it.68 However, some nations contribute enormously to peace-support operations, even 
beyond their capabilities, while other nations contribute little. The main reason behind 
that is that states have different motivations for their peace-support involvement.  
Scholars explain the motivation behind states’ participation in peace-support 
operations from realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives. Realist scholars explain 
that a state’s motivation to participate in peacekeeping operations is tied to the state’s 
national interests and each state acts to maintain the international status quo.69  Liberal 
scholars explain states’ motivations in terms of multilateral foreign and domestic policy, 
involvement and cooperation of international organizations, and civil–military relations. 
Constructivists explain that democratic normative considerations drive states’ 
commitments.70 In truth, all these perspectives may or may not apply. All theoretical 
approaches to explaining the motivations behind state commitment are not enough to 
explain the full spectrum of reasons.  
This chapter shall consider the main motives that prompted a small country like 
Mongolia, with limited resources and economic strengths at its command, to venture into 
participation in global peace-support operations. There are no empirical studies or 
literature evaluating Mongolia’s choice and the principal motivations behind it.  
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Jargalsaikhan Mendee asserts four the principal motivations: first, a foreign policy 
of national survival; second, military modernization; third, the utility of external 
standards for readiness; and fourth, “rebranding” the army for international service.71  
Mongolia’s relatively quick success in peace-support operations should not be 
mainly credited to external motives; it is should equally be attributed to internal motives. 
Externally, Mongolia’s commitment to peace-support operations is directly related to its 
own national interests, and provided a good opportunity to increase international 
reputation and prestige. Internally, participating in peacekeeping operations brings 
military experience and opportunities to reorient and modernize and transform the 
military into a modern military force capable of today’s complex challenges, increasing 
its effectiveness to perform tasks and missions. In addition, peace-support operations 
bring financial benefits, especially for small and developing countries. As in the case of 
Mongolia, economic incentives can be used to develop its military.  
A. EXTERNAL MOTIVATION 
The key external factor behind Mongolia’s motivations is the country’s national 
security environment, national interests, and overall effort to raise its image, profile, and 
prestige in the international arena. Understanding the principal external motivations 
behind Mongolia’s interest in participating in peace-support operations requires 
understanding Mongolia’s main strategic interest: the continued survival and existence of 
Mongolia.72 “If national leaders see their states' interests inexorably linked to the 
continuation of the international status quo, they will support and defend the status 
quo.”73  
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Mongolia is among those countries with this philosophy. Participation in peace-support 
operations gives countries an opportunity to increase their reputation and prestige in the 
international arena.74  
Laura Neack explains that a state’s motivation to participate in peacekeeping 
operations is tied to the state’s national interests and that each state acts to maintain the 
international status quo.75 From a realist perspective, the commitment of states is driven 
by national interest. 
The realist explanation of state participation in UN peace-keeping is that 
states do whatever they can, given their power resources, to protect and 
preserve their national interests. If national leaders see their states' 
interests inexorably linked to the continuation of the international status 
quo, they will support and defend the status quo.76 
For example, Mongolia faces political challenges to its participation in peace-
support operations, as it is located between the two giant military powers of Russia and 
China. Mongolia needs to show these countries that its armed forces transformation and 
PSO capability development is only focused on increasing its international reputation and 
contributing to international peace and security. 
Countries usually do not want to be involved in a crisis or conflict that directly 
impacts their national interest. However, we can see that many African nations are 
participating in peacekeeping missions because of geographic proximity and because it 
directly impacts them. Another example is the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC). Conflicting interests among the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council (Russia, USA, France, and China) and regional countries (Vietnam, 
Australia, Japan, Indonesia) has affected the implementation of the overall mission 
mandate.77 In Mongolia’s case, there is no conflicting interest in any crisis or situation 
that directly impacts its national security. 
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Collective security plays an important role in maintaining and promoting 
international peace and security. The UN provides the framework for an effective 
collective security system; however, the system often fails to work perfectly. The success 
of collective security depends on the commitment of UN member states. Thomas G. 
Weiss states that UN member states need to be willing to sacrifice some national interests 
in the name of collective security.78 In this regard, the question occurs whether Mongolia 
needs to sacrifice its national interest. The answer is unclear. Mongolia needs to ponder 
thus. 
States’ interests and commitment to peace-support operations are shaped by their 
foreign and defense policies. According to Arturo C. Sotomayor,  
Countries with externally oriented doctrines and integrated foreign and 
defense policies are more likely to commit troops to the UN than countries 
with national security doctrines, segregated military and foreign policy 
roles.79 
He also stresses that such missions “can provide a means to transit from one 
doctrine to another without provoking large budgetary and operational cuts justifying 
some levels of expenditure at a time when immanent internal security threats are 
eroding.”80 States use peacekeeping to reorient the mission of the military and provide it 
with an externally oriented mission.81 There is an interesting observation that cannot be 
ignored. In Mongolia’s case, this conclusion leads to different insights and raises 
interesting questions. Currently, Mongolia’s foreign and defense policies are more 
integrated than previously. One of the primary missions of the Mongolian military is 
participation in peace-support operations, which became a brand new mission for the 
armed forces. From this point of view, some people argue that Mongolia have an 
externally oriented defense doctrine. In contrast, the basic principle of Mongolia’s 
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defense doctrine is self-defense. Based on this principle, someone may argue that 
Mongolia had an internally oriented national-security doctrine, based on the country’s 
threat assessment or geographical location. Some also claim that in recent years, 
Mongolia has been reorienting its primary territorial self-defense mission to an externally 
oriented mission. In both cases, Mongolia’s foreign and defense doctrines have not been 
segregated, before or now. 
The questions that arise from these insights are: What is the principal 
characteristic of Mongolia’s foreign and defense doctrine as relates to its commitment to 
peace-support operations? Is Mongolia’s commitment to peace support based on 
externally oriented doctrine and integrated policies, or on internally oriented doctrine and 
segregated policies, or mixed (internal and external) doctrinal principles?82 In the 
author’s perception, Mongolia’s commitment to peace-support operations is unique and 
based on externally and internally oriented doctrine and policies. On the other hand, 
Mongolia might belong to the group of countries with externally oriented doctrines and 
integrated foreign and defense policies, as Arturo Sotomayor mentions in his work.83  
A country’s regime type is another factor affecting its commitment to peace-
support operations. The record indicates that democratic countries are more committed to 
peacekeeping than are autocratic and totalitarian countries. Democratic states share 
democratic values and norms, while autocratic and totalitarian do not necessarily share 
any values or ideologically charged norms.84 This does not explain why states like Jordan 
and China have given enormous contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. As a 
democratic country, Mongolia has followed those universally accepted democratic values 
and norms that have allowed Mongolia to participate in peace-support operations. 
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Some states have refused to participate in peacekeeping operations because they 
have already identified their friends and enemies.85 The UN Security Council (UNSC) 
does not always respond to conflicts fast enough and the permanent members of the 
UNSC always consider their own national interests first when deciding to use military 
force. Bottom line, most troop-contributing countries are not willing to send their military 
personnel to this kind of mission, especially a peace-enforcement mission, except when a 
vital national interest has been challenged.86 Currently, Mongolia does not face a 
situation in which its vital national interests are challenged. Peaceful cooperation with 
other countries, its prestige in the world arena and its multi-pillar foreign policy allow 
Mongolia to make friends with many countries around the world and increase its 
commitment to peace-support operations. 
Another factor influencing the decision to participate in peacekeeping operations 
is that participation gives an opportunity for countries to increase their reputation and 
prestige in the international arena. For instance, small and developing countries realize 
that participation in peacekeeping and coalition operations gives the country the 
opportunity to support diplomatic policy and provide for the security of the country 
through political-diplomatic means.  Likewise, political and military leaders understand 
that peace-support operations can complement this aspect of diplomacy 
For example, China’s contribution to maintaining international peace and security 
has significantly increased over the last two decades.  China’s military has been 
participating in an international effort to combat piracy and has contributed hugely to 
peacekeeping and humanitarian disaster-relief operations around the world.  Increased 
participation in PKO contributes to China’s international reputation. All these 
commitments are directly connected to their foreign policy and national interests. A 
country’s foreign policy always determines its commitment to UN peacekeeping 
operations. 
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Another example is Brazil’s participation in peacekeeping operations due to their 
foreign policy. Brazil is seeking to be an emerging power in regional and world affairs.87 
Peacekeeping is one of the tools by which they can implement this policy. Like these 
countries, active participation in peace-support operations creates favorable conditions 
for Mongolia to implement its national security and foreign policy. 
For Mongolia, the main external factors to participate in peace-support operations 
are national security and national survival. In order to understand Mongolia’s motivation 
to participate in peace-support operations completely, internal factors must also be 
examined.   
B. INTERNAL MOTIVATION 
In recent years, Mongolia’s commitment to peace-support operations has been 
rapidly increasing and counts as one of the top troop contributors to UN peacekeeping 
operations. It is a surprising development for a country that faced a large manpower and 
funding reduction after the demise of its communist regime. 
Some states send troops to peacekeeping operations in order to institutionalize 
and enhance capabilities and skills, or to gain military experience for their military. In 
other words, participating in peacekeeping operations helps developing and young 
democratic countries, such as Mongolia, that are seeking to develop a professional army 
and establish an interoperable, compact, capable, professional military.88 In addition, 
some countries use peacekeeping to reorient the mission of the military and provide an 
externally oriented mission.  For instance, after its defeat in the Falklands War, 
Argentina’s government reoriented its military from an internal to an externally oriented 
mission. The solution was to participate in peacekeeping operations.89 
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The objective to develop a modern military is the most important internal 
motivation factor for Mongolia. A state’s decision to deploy its military overseas must 
have the consent and support of its military institutions. Some states are reluctant to 
provide their military for peace-support operations because they are offered few 
institutional and professional incentives, while others more willing to contribute.90  In 
Mongolia’s case, the military institutions, including the armed forces, internal troops, 
border troops, and national police force, all comprehended that participation in peace-
support operations would actually benefit Mongolia’s military institution. Each returning 
rotation brought back new and valuable experience and knowledge that helped the 
modernization of the Mongolian armed forces and improved its overall capability, 
particularly peace-support operations capability. Participation in peace-support operations 
has provided real-time combat and non-combat experience and expertise. For instance, in 
a miserable event that occurred right after the parliamentary elections on 1 July 2008, the 
armed forces used experiences and expertise gained from overseas operations to stabilize 
and neutralize the situation during a declared state emergency. 
Some people may argue that state commitment is driven by economic incentives 
and these are the most important internal motivation factor. But it is not the most 
important motivating factor for state commitment to peace-support operations. Some 
state contributions are driven by economic incentives, which can add up to significant 
windfalls for a developing economy. That is why most states participating in 
peacekeeping operations are developing countries.91 Participating in peacekeeping 
operations brings financial and economic benefits to troop-contributing countries because 
most of them are developing countries. For example, Uruguay’s commitment to 
peacekeeping operations is driven by economic motivation.92 There is no question but 
that a peacekeeping operation brings significant financial advantages and additional 
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finances are needed for training, service, maintenance, and equipment.  Trevor Findlay 
points out, “Some poorer states can indeed make a profit on such transactions, but the UN 
is usually so slow in paying and the amount so relatively niggardly that [it] cannot be a 
sole motivating factor.”93 
Some countries are using the money received from the UN for their military 
development or the development of other economic sectors. Mongolia’s commitment to 
peacekeeping operations is driven by the desire to develop its military rather than to 
develop other economic sectors. For instance, the Mongolian government established 
“The Armed Forces Development Fund” and transferred all reimbursement money from 
the UN and other countries to this fund. Between 2005 and 2011, Mongolia received 
USD $2.7 million from the U.S. and USD $25.6 million from the UN in 
reimbursement.94 Those reimbursements helped Mongolia finance its military 
institutional reform and improve its personnel social welfare and life conditions.95 
According to statistical data, in 2011, the income collected in the fund was approximately 
USD $4.5 million and almost all that money was spent: approximately USD $4.0 million 
was used for pre-deployment training and preparation, multinational training exercises, 
renovation of major and minor equipment, and social welfare and allowances of deployed 
personnel.96 These figures clearly illustrate and support the argument that the motivation 
for Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations was not based on economic 
incentives; instead, it was based on creating and improving a strong peace-support 
capability and transforming its armed forces into a capable, professional, and deployable 
force. The Mongolian military spent all financial resources from outside sources for this 
purpose, even spending additional money to meet the standards and requirements of 
peace-support operations. 
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There are other factors determining Mongolia’s participation in peace-support 
operations. For instance, the economic levels of Mongolia affect its commitment to these 
operations. The current peace-support operations in which Mongolia is participating 
require more financial support. The recent global economic crisis has affected 
Mongolia’s economic capability of sustaining and continuing its commitment. 
The risk of casualties is also a very important concern for Mongolia, as for all 
countries participating in peace-support operations. Coalition-led operations, such as the 
Iraq and Afghanistan operations and some UN peace enforcement missions require 
engaging in combat and taking casualties. Not all countries are willing to contribute to 
peace-enforcement operations because of this risk of casualties. Luckily, Mongolia hasn’t 
suffered any combat casualties since its participation in peace-support operations. In the 
future, Mongolia needs to prepare its military and public physiologically and mentally for 
the risk of taking casualties. 
The altruistic motivation of peacekeepers is another important factor that cannot 
be ignored in states’ motivations. We need to comprehend the factors that motivate 
soldiers and civilians to participate in peace-support operations and implications for 
states commitment. Patriotism, nationalism, and the ideology to sacrifice for the country 
are not the only motivating factors; other factors, such as family influence, and social and 
living environment also count as motivating factors of the peacekeepers. Fabrizio 
Battistelli argues that motives such as being useful to others, strengthening the country’s 
image, earning extra money, learning new things that could be useful for life, gaining 
new experience and knowledge, and satisfying a desire for adventure drive and motivate 
many military personnel to participate peace-support operations.97 
In the case of Mongolia, there are no any studies or literature about the motivation 
of Mongolia’s peacekeepers. Systematic in-depth analysis on this topic is required. To 
understand the main motivating factors of Mongolia’s peacekeepers, the author here 
shares his view on the topic. For Mongolia’s peacekeepers, there are several motivating 
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factors that have influenced peacekeepers to participate in peace-support operations. 
However, the following three factors are the most important from the author’s viewpoint. 
Financial advantages and economic rewards are the most important factor for 
Mongolia’s peacekeepers. According to the CIA–The World Factbook statistical data, 
overall Mongolia’s GDP (gross domestic product) of USD $13.28 billion placed 141st 
among the world countries and spending was about 1.4% of GDP for the defense 
sector.98 GDP per capita is USD $4,500, in 156th place, and 39.2% of the population 
lives below the poverty line, including some armed forces personnel.99 The average 
salary of military personnel is approximately USD $400 per month. That salary is not 
enough to cover all personal living expenses. On one hand, such a figure is 
understandable, because of the limited financial resources, shortage of money, and 
overall small economic strength of Mongolia. On the other hand, this low income for 
soldiers encourages and pushes them unswervingly to participate in peace-support 
operations and creates competition between them for selection because they earn more 
money than they might at home. 
In addition, participation in peacekeeping operations helps Mongolia’s 
government finance its military while providing salary incentives for soldiers. The UN 
pays a fixed amount of money ($1,028) per soldier per month. Mongolia’s government 
takes 30% of this money and puts it in the armed forces development fund. Another 70% 
goes to the individuals. In addition, soldiers receive $1.28 per day while serving in the 
field for their daily use and a full salary back home. Overall, individual soldiers/officers 
gain from their participation in peacekeeping operations. This money helps individuals to 
improve their life conditions, so money plays a substantial role in the decision to 
participate in the mission. 
Second, participation in different peace-support operations constitutes an 
important element in their future military career and development, especially for the 
officers, and probably for their future civilian careers when they retire. For officers, as 
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99 Ibid.  
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well as for non-commissioned officers, to participate in peace-support operations has 
become one of the requirements for promotion to the next rank or higher position. 
Another reason for this might be that it increases the chance to be select for various levels 
of professional military training schools, colleges, and universities overseas. 
Finally, Mongolian peacekeepers are motivated by the desire to learn new things 
that could be useful for life and to gain new military experience and knowledge. Since its 
first deployment to peace-support operations, Mongolian peacekeepers have gained a 
tremendous amount of knowledge and experience and learned new tactics, doctrine, and 
procedures from fellow soldiers from around the world. The peacekeepers recognize that 
participating in peace-support operations is an opportunity to experience real-life combat 
situations, exciting adventures, and a chance to learn about a different culture and 
different people. Furthermore, it is an opportunity to test their professional military skills 
and knowledge. Participation in peace-support operations gives a unique experience of 
effectively acting in difficult situations, to cooperate and communicate and command in 
unsafe, non-predictable environments, and unstable situations and circumstances.100 
However, we need to consider the aforementioned factors, because motivations of 
the peacekeepers vary, depending on individual characteristics and physiological levels.  
In addition, motivations may vary from mission to mission.101 In peace-support 
operations, the soldiers’ duty, tasks, missions, mandate, and rules of engagement are 
different from those in major combat operations. To study the motivation of Mongolian 
peacekeepers would help Mongolian political and military officials explore, recognize, 
and identify the problems of military personnel, develop concepts and doctrine of 
participation in peace-support operations, and discover possible actions to fill the gap 
between reality and concepts, tactics, doctrine and capabilities. This could change the 
level of motivation. Most importantly, further research on this topic could provide the 
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strategy and concepts for solving one of the substantial challenges of recruitment and 
provide and sustain the level of manpower in peace-support operations of the near future. 
The ability to fulfill this requirement depends on motivating personnel and civilians, 
including young men and women, to participate in peace-support operations. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has focused on the question of the principal motivations behind 
Mongolia’s commitment to participation in peace-support operations. This analysis 
provides the specific background analysis as to why small countries like Mongolia 
commit to international peace and security missions. However, this analysis cannot 
provide a full spectrum of state motivations behind these contributions, so it is difficult to 
apply to all other countries.  
Peace-support operations are conducted in a very complex security environment. 
The size, number, and cost of such operations have significantly increased in the last two 
decades. It would be a mistake to assume that the UN and other countries will inevitably 
move away from traditional peacekeeping towards peace enforcement. These realities 
make peacekeeping operations increasingly complex and dangerous, increasing the risk 
of mission failure. This requires that states increase their contributions to peace-support 
operations.  
Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations is not encouraged so much 
by economic gains as by the concomitant modernization and reorganization of its armed 
forces, in line with global standards and development of “world-class” peacekeepers and 
fighting forces. On the other hand, its participation is bolstered by national security and 
national survival. 
In terms of civil–military relations, Mongolia’s civilian and military bureaucracies 
that deal with the county’s foreign and national-security affairs have always supported 
each other since Mongolia started its contribution to peace-support operations. A 
mechanism and level of cooperation are already in place between the foreign affairs and 
defense ministries in order to participate in peace-support operations, and there is no 
argument about who will dominate in the policy decision-making process. For Mongolia, 
 46
the use of the military is a tool for implementing foreign policy, not diplomatic failure. It 
is an opportunity to obtain political gains.102 Politically, Mongolia wins prestige in the 
world community, increasing its image and promising its survival and existence through 
active participation. 
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IV. IMPLICATION FOR MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
AND MODERNIZATION  
In the last decade, the Mongolian military has been developing its peace-support 
capability in conjunction with a military modernization effort. It is important to analyze 
the modernization of the Mongolian military and peace-support operations capability 
development process in order to ascertain what kind of capabilities they have and what 
needs to be improved and is required for their future commitment. Furthermore, this 
analysis give readers a broad understanding of Mongolian military modernization and the 
measures taken to improve its peace-support operations capability. It also offers some 
possible recommendations. 
Mongolian defense and defense-related laws, policies, and concepts are directed 
towards improving its defense capability, seeking an appropriate and capable force 
structure while also changing the roles of traditional military capabilities to deployment-
oriented operational capabilities and domestic disaster-relief operation capabilities. In 
other words, these changes will bring the military closer to the standards of a 
professionally-oriented military by making fundamental and qualitative changes in its 
legal establishment, force structure, organization, modernization of equipment, personnel 
management, training, and educational system, logistic system and improvements civil-
military relations. USPACOM Commander Admiral Robert F. Willard emphasizes that 
“The Mongolian Defense Reform (MDR) assists the Mongolian Armed Forces with its 
transformation into a self-sustaining, international peacekeeping force capable of 
contributing to UN, international, and coalition missions.”103 
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A. IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND 
MODERNIZATION 
1. Mongolia’s Military Modernization Process 
For the Mongolian military, the origin of the idea of modernization began after 
the Cold War with the collapse of the communist political and social structures and the 
rapidly changing security environment that followed. After the change in political and 
economic structures in the 1990s, the use of the military, and the state of the Mongolian 
military, was debated among politicians, the military and the public in general. During 
the communist regime, the Mongolian armed forces were basically designed to protect 
the territory of Mongolia. Defense planning and doctrines were based on threat-based 
scenarios or planning approaches like the Soviet Union’s. Forces were trained to fight in 
conventional warfare, not asymmetric warfare as in other Western militaries. 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 
2001, continuing terrorist attacks, increasing interstate and intrastate conflicts, 
secessionist wars around the globe, and growing asymmetrical threats in the 21st century, 
including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational 
crimes, clearly display that the old defense-planning approach, organizational structures, 
and platforms cannot meet today’s challenges and satisfy Mongolia’s desire to secure its 
national interest, territory and existence. Mongolia’s civilian and military bureaucracy 
initiated military modernization in order to meet today’s requirements and catch up with 
other militaries. 
The Basis of State Military Policy of Mongolia asserts, “Mongolia shall have a 
compact, capable, and professionally-oriented armed forces tailored to the peace-time 
needs and the economic potential of its country”.104 In the last decade, Mongolia has 
implemented several projects for the development, modernization, and restructuring of its 
military to cope with new types of challenges and strategic uncertainties.  Before 2000, 
some programs and projects took place; however, they were postponed because of 
financial restraints. Due to the initial successful participation in peace-support operations, 
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Mongolia’s government and its military observed that military reform was crucial for 
capability development, reconsidered its development and modernization plans, and 
made necessary changes.  
In 2006, Mongolia started to implement a new defense development and 
modernization program called "The Armed Forces Development Program through the 
Year 2015”.105 This program succeeded the previous program, the "Development 
Program of Military Establishment till 2005," which was a mid-term development plan 
for the armed forces. In the framework of a new transformation program, the GSMAF 
developed the “Development of Peace Support Operations Capability of the Armed 
Forces” project, and this became one of the key projects attached to the main program. 
The primary objective of this program is: 
Along with carrying out its primary mission, the Armed Forces will 
develop a capable and professional force to participate in United Nations 
Peacekeeping missions, to counter terrorism and conduct humanitarian 
efforts in emergency situations of natural and man-made disasters as well 
as non-traditional threats.106 
The main directions of the plan are to enhance the capabilities of the armed forces 
to participate in UN peacekeeping and international missions; to modernize weapons 
platforms and equipment through defense-resource management and acquisition 
processes—in particular, focusing on upgrading the air defense system through 
cooperation between commercial air and the air force in peacetime—and to prepare to 
support efforts to protect the population and environment during emergency situations, 
such as natural and manmade disasters and other non-traditional threats; fourth, to 
enhance counterterrorism capabilities; fifth, to transform organizational structure and 
concept development.107 In order words, the priorities of this program are to adjust the 
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Mongolian armed forces structure and organization to a non-traditional threat 
environment and new missions imposed by the law, enhance peace-support operations 
capability, improve defense resource management, renew and renovate old equipment, 
acquire new platforms and technology, change the current education and training system 
and improve the social welfare system of the personnel. 
In the author’s estimation, the current "Armed Forces Development Program 
through the Year of 2015” is only focused on the further development and modernization 
of the Mongolian military in alignment with national and international operational needs, 
not on complete transformation. The plan is mainly focused on upgrades or adapting 
existing capabilities, weapon systems and modernization of current operational concepts 
and doctrines based on capabilities that they have. The main problem is that the 
Mongolian military is still struggling to understand the meaning and differences in 
military transformation and modernization. From this point of view, the author argues 
that Mongolia’s current implementation of military reform does not contain the main 
characteristics of the transformation; it is just a modernization plan that contains fewer 
transformation elements. 
Transformation is intended to improve the overall capabilities of the military to 
conduct full-spectrum operations in complex asymmetric environments, including peace-
support operations.  The Department of Defense of the U.S. states: 
Transformation is a process that shapes the changing nature of military 
competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, 
capabilities, people, and organization.108 
In his book, Scott Jasper says that transformation is: 
…[a] process that shapes the nature of military competition and 
cooperation through new combinations of emerging technologies, 
streamlined organization structures, innovative processes, and adaptive 
personnel developments that exploit national advantage and protect 
against asymmetric vulnerabilities and has no end state.109 
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Transformation “encompasses accelerated technological modernization, doctrinal 
reform, and reorganization of force structures, a culture open to change, and willingness 
to accept risk”.110 Transformation must involve new ideas and concepts, as well as the 
modernization of old platforms to meet the challenges of the new environment.111  
Modernization can be defined as a process to “acquire and develop new 
equipment, or improve, upgrade or adapt existing weapons platforms and equipment to 
meet identified capability gaps and to achieve dominance in core capabilities.”112 In this 
regard, transformation is a completely different concept from modernization. 
Transformation is a revolutionary process creating new “breakthroughs” or “leaps ahead” 
in innovative technologies, operational doctrine, tactics, and capabilities. By contrast, in 
terms of military capability, modernization manifests itself in the technical sophistication 
of structures, weapons systems, and equipment. 
From this point of view, the current military reform plan of Mongolia does not 
contain the main characteristics of transformation. The changes fall under the label of 
modernization, not transformation. The current reform plan identifies a number of areas 
that need changes; however, it does not well cover or pay attention to creating or 
acquiring new sets of breakthrough or leap-ahead, innovative technologies, operational 
doctrines, training, and education systems; nor does it rethink organizational structures, 
tactics, and capabilities. This is understandable because of limited resources and funds 
and a shortage of educated personnel who can lead this effort.  
Since its first deployment overseas, the Mongolian military has identified several 
gaps that are necessary for military reform and its military modernization plan and taken 
several steps. Within this program, the Mongolian military is transforming its 
organization structure from old Soviet-based structures to Western military structures.  In 
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2009, the GSMAF reorganized its structure to the “J” system (joint system). The 
significance of this reform was the establishment of two service commands, the general-
purpose troops command and the air and air-defense command.113 Previously, the air and 
air defense (air force) component was inside the land component. Nonetheless, this 
structural change stagnated at the general staff level and was not implemented at the 
regiment-battalion-company levels until now.  
One of the areas for consideration of this program was to reform the current 
acquisition and budgeting system and to establish a reliable defense-resource 
management system. The MAF acquisition and budgeting system was based on a 
centralized planning system. In other words, Mongolia’s defense planning was directly 
dependent on the allocated budget from the government. Previously, the military had no 
input in its own budget. Currently, Mongolia’s defense budgeting system is changing and 
trying to match current standards. Financing for overseas operations still remains a big 
constraint and challenge for the Mongolian military.  
2. Peace Support Operations Capability Development 
Mongolia has taken deliberate steps and is progressing in developing its peace-
support operations capability in order to integrate and operate more effectively with 
foreign forces in peace-support operations. In the framework of “The Armed Forces 
Development Program Through Year 2015”, the GSMAF developed the project, 
“Development of Peace Support Operations Capability of the Armed Forces,” one of the 
key projects essential for military modernization efforts. Within this project, three sub-
projects were developed: “Development of Peace Support Operations Training Center,” 
“Development of Equipment Acquisition of Designated Units Assigned to Participate 
Peace-Support Operations,” and “Military Police.” 
The main objective of this project is to reform and reorganize the armed forces 
and transform them through defense-resource management procedures in order to 
develop world-class peacekeeping forces compatible with the United Nations and 
                                                 
113 The General Purpose Troops Command is can interpreted to Land Force Command.  
 53
coalition operations.114 This project started in 2006 and will continue until 2015 in three 
phases. The project not only focuses on establishing a brigade-size peace-support 
operations force, but also on establishing suitable organizational command-and-control 
structures, a legal framework, modifying and changing old Soviet military doctrine and 
tactics, improvements in the existing peace-support-operations training system, and 
development of deployable and sustainable logistic capability.115 
The existing capabilities of Mongolia’s armed forces for peace-support operations 
are two partially-manned designated infantry battalions, some combat-service support 
units, including a UN Level II deployable field medical hospital, a military-police 
company, three combat engineering battalions, an armed forces foreign-language training 
center, and a national peace-support operations training center.   
A typical Mongolian deployment to peace-support operations is a mid or full-
sized infantry company and above with small, specialized, mobile-training units and a 
handful of military observers and staff officers. The Mongolian military aims to establish 
a brigade-size force for peace-support operations, along with all necessary support 
capabilities, by 2015. The brigade will consist of three light-infantry battalions and a 
combat-service support (CSS) battalion totaling 2,500 personnel. The CSS battalion will 
consist of a deployable medical hospital, military police, and engineering, nuclear, 
biological, chemical, transportation, and logistic detachments. The third battalion will be 
established in 2012. Those battalion’s equipment, weaponry, manpower, and structures 
still do not fully meet UN force requirements and standards. A new brigade will serve as 
a blueprint for the rest of the units. In this regard, international military aid and assistance 
is essential in achieving the objectives. This will allow Mongolia to provide fully 
operationally capable brigade-sized peacekeepers for peace-support operations. 
In order to develop its peace-support-operations capability, the Ministry of 
Defense decided to establish a peacekeeping office in GSMAF in 1999. Since then, the 
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responsibility of this office has expanded and the main tasks include overseeing, 
coordinating, monitoring, evaluating and building peace-support operations capacity 
within the armed forces and the comprehensive management, planning, and execution of 
overseas deployment. 
Mongolia is modifying its national peace-support operations training center 
(known as Five Hills) to become a regional training center as a venue for Asian–Pacific 
countries for  training and improving interoperability and confidence building among 
regional countries. Mongolia annually hosts and cosponsors several multinational, 
bilateral field exercises such as Khan Quest, MPAT Tempest Express, Non-Lethal 
Weapons Executive Seminar, and multinational and bilateral conferences, seminars, and 
courses in its own training center. Mongolia has invested in building new training 
facilities (an urban-operations training facility), training lanes, mobile accommodations 
and logistic capabilities to conduct multinational, bilateral, and regular exercises; 
however, this effort is struggling with lack of funding. Since 2005, the U.S. government 
has invested approximately USD $5.7 million for the renovation of national peace-
support-operations training center facilities and other activities.116 The investment is 
coming through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the program for building 
peacekeeping capacity around the world, created by the George W. Bush administration.  
At the same time, Mongolian military is actively engaged in several joint, 
combined, and multinational exercises and various courses abroad. These exercises and 
activities are designed to upgrade the peace-support operations capabilities of the 
Mongolian military, enhance its interoperability with other foreign militaries, and 
develop common tactics, techniques, and procedures for peace-support operations. 
In the framework of a new capability-development project, one of the important 
steps Mongolia has taken is the development of a new peace-support operations doctrine. 
The Mongolian military is analyzing and applying lessons from participation in peace-
support operations and using those experiences as a basis for a new doctrine, while 
working with several countries including the US, Canada, France, UK, and Switzerland. 
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However, this process has stagnated because of lack of will and lack of education. 
Mongolia could use other countries’ doctrines as references and starting points. 
Since 1995, the Mongolian military has sent its officers and non-commissioned 
officers abroad for professional military-education training and courses. Sending its 
military personnel to overseas educational institutions has enabled the Mongolian 
military to learn and experience peace-support operations. Between 1992 and 2011, the 
U.S spent around USD $13 million for the education and training of Mongolian military 
personnel. Approximately 298 Mongolia military personnel were trained and educated in 
U.S. military educational institutions under the IMET (International Military Education 
Training) program during this period.117 
Mongolia is paying attention to training and educating its leadership at the 
strategic and operational decision-making levels. Forty-one personnel118 out of 298 have 
received professional military education and master’s degrees in the U.S. National 
Defense University, Industrial College, U.S Army and Air Force Command and General 
Staff College, USMC Command and Staff College, and the Naval Postgraduate School, 
and most of them hold leadership positions in the ministry of defense and general staff 
headquarters. They are contributing vast amounts of knowledge and expertise crucial to 
Mongolian defense reform and peace-support operations capability development.  
One of the challenges associated with deployment is the language barrier. In order 
to solve this problem, Mongolia has established an armed forces foreign language 
training center within the framework of the capability-development project. However, it 
still cannot meet its current requirement and lacks English-speaking personnel. 
The Mongolian military is still equipped with old Soviet-style weaponry and 
equipment. That weaponry and equipment cannot meet current operational requirements 
and are not interoperable with other militaries. In order to supersede this demand, and 
implement a capability development plan, Mongolia is working closely with the U.S. 
                                                 




government and receiving budgetary and technical assistance for its defense reform and 
modernization through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). For instance, 
the U.S. had contributed USD $4.52 million to Mongolia for peace-support-operations 
capability development as of June 2010.119 It included battalion-level communication 
equipment, individual gear, and battalion-logistics equipment, vehicles, and training. 
Moreover, within the framework of the development program, the Mongolian military 
has received several weaponry systems and equipment from other countries. For instance, 
in 2009, Mongolia received approximately USD $900 million in military aid from Russia, 
including MI24B attack helicopters, an MI8 transport helicopter, T-72 tanks, BTR-70 and 
BTR-80 armored personnel carriers, an air-defense system, and mobile maintenance 
systems. It also received approximately 88 million Yuan (Chinese currency) in military 
aid and assistance from China between 1999 and 2008.120 
In military terms, a capability is defined as “the ability to generate desired effects 
in a military operation, under a set of conditions, and to a specific standard”.121 In other 
words, military capability gives the ability to produce expected effects in specific 
environments in which the military force operating. For Mongolia to identify and fulfill 
the gap in its peace-support operations capabilities, it is necessary to accomplish a brand 
new mission: peacekeeping. Today, Mongolia’s peace-support operations capability is 
limited because of inadequate funding, a shortage of experienced manpower, lack of 
major and minor equipment, and inappropriate doctrine, tactics, training and military 
education. 
B. IDENTIFYING WAYS TO INCREASE MONGOLIA’S FUTURE 
PARTICIPATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
Until today, no deep-cutting reform, modernization, or transformation has been 
completed in the Mongolian military. Only partial changes have been made. Still required 
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are more efforts and resources and critical thinking in order to complete the reform and 
peace-support operations-capability development process. Based on the author’s analysis 
and research, the following recommendations can be made to increase and improve 
efficiency and effectiveness of Mongolia’s commitment to peace-support operations. 
First, at the strategic level, the Mongolian military still does not have a clear 
understanding of the difference between modernization and transformation. Mongolia’s 
recent military-development plan mainly focused on modernization. Transformation 
creates new competitive areas, identifies new sources of power, and changes military 
culture. In contrast, modernization is focused on modifying and improving existing 
platforms and capabilities. The development of core and specific capabilities, which 
include intelligence gathering and information sharing (an early-warning system), 
surveillance, mobility, training, integrated joint mission planning, and a sustainable long-
term logistic system will accelerate the modernization process and help Mongolia 
increase its commitment to peace-support operations. 
Second, Mongolia has not made full capability-based assessments in its defense 
capability until now. Mongolia needs to make such assessments and determine how to 
use its military in the future. That will help increase its peace-support operations 
capability overall. A capability-based approach should reflect Mongolia’s national 
security and threat environments, its economic capacity, and the need to incorporate 
RMA components into its modernization program. This assessment or analysis requires 
joint efforts and a high degree of cooperation between civilian and military 
bureaucracies. Political will, strong support from the legislative and executive branches, 
sufficient budget allocations, and interagency cooperation and coordination are required 
to accomplish this reform program. In other words, Mongolia needs to support long-term, 
precise, and defined reform planning. 
Third, a comprehensive, coherent strategic framework (mission specific, with a 
unified doctrine and guidelines), backed by political support, is essential for 
modernization and capability development. One of the weak links of Mongolia’s military 
modernization plan is its outdated military strategy and doctrines. The Soviet’s military 
doctrine and tactics heavily influenced Mongolia’s military doctrine. Active participation 
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in peace-support operations demands that Mongolia’s military reconsider and rewrite its 
military doctrine and defense policy related to the use of the military in the future. A 
capability development must be based on doctrinal documents that contain analysis of the 
predicted security environment, potential types of future missions on which the military 
force could be send, and clearly defined capability needs and requirements. In addition, 
peace-support operations doctrine must be relevant to and based on Mongolian military 
culture, national laws, experiences, the nature of peace-support operations, and an 
assessment of the current and future security environment of Mongolia. In order to fill 
this gap, the MAF should establish a doctrine-development and lessons-learned center 
and pay attention to applying lessons from the past to future peace-support operations. 
Right now, there is no written comprehensive review, research survey, or book on this 
topic.  
Fourth, one of the essential elements of peace-support-operations capability 
development is enhancing training and educational institutions. The Mongolian military 
needs to improve its professional military education and training institutions and training 
curriculum, increase cooperation with foreign military-education institutions and 
international organizations, and increase its participation in multinational/bilateral 
exercises and training events that enhance regional cooperation and improve 
interoperability. The National Defense University of Mongolia and other military 
educational institutions are required to modify and adjust their educational and training 
programs in order to meet today’s requirements, and they need to recruit experienced, 
knowledgeable and trained academics and scholars. The development of a modernization 
program and peace-support-operations capability development is dependent on the 
training of a new generation of officers and NCO corps.  
In the author’s view, the Mongolian military needs to change the foundation of 
the current Soviet-style military education system completely. Without changing it, the 
military cannot achieve its desired end-state and objectives of pursuing education and 
training capability development. Pre-deployment and post-deployment training standards 
should be developed.  Currently, the Mongolian armed forces have deployment training 
packages, but they do not meet operational requirements.  
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Senior leadership, who have been trained, educated, and have international 
exposure and experience, should lead in fostering innovation and adaptation for the new 
century, ensuring that process is on the right track. They will contribute vast amounts of 
knowledge and expertise crucial to Mongolian defense reform and peace-support-
operations capability development. For this reason, Mongolia should continue to send its 
officers and NCOs for training to Western, developed countries122 and require a complete 
change in the foundations of military-education institutions. 
Fifth, a capability development must be tied with organizational structural 
changes.  When the Mongolian military changes its force structure, it needs to consider 
its own military culture, needs, and security environment. The Mongolian military not 
only needs to copy the Western military structure, it needs to take and apply the most 
applicable pieces to meet Mongolia’s requirements. The Mongolian military needs an 
organizational structure that supports its commitments to peace-support operations and 
the capability-development process. Flexible, highly independent, mobile, proper force 
structures are essential when the Mongolian military deploys to various peace-support 
operations. Newly created and restructured peace-support operations designated units 
could be the example for reorganizing all its military units and helping to make the 
Mongolian military more interoperable with foreign forces in peace-support operations. 
The Mongolian military needs to reconsider the current planned structure of the 
peace-support-operations brigade. The Mongolian military does not have the capability to 
deploy a full brigade in the near term. Current capability allows the MAF to deploy one 
battalion at a time. Mongolia’s currently deployed units to peace-support operations 
consist of representatives of different units, which has both negative and positive effects. 
On the positive side, they are gaining expertise and learning from foreign militaries and 
each other while performing their tasks in the mission. When they return to their 
designated units, those soldiers share their knowledge and experience with others and 
input knowledge into the modernization of the military. On the negative side, choosing 
personnel from different units could adversely affect the combat readiness of those 
                                                 
122 Bold Ravdan, “New Defense Strategy”, in The Mongolian Strategic View, (The Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 1996), 15. 
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specific military units and undermine overall combat readiness. Furthermore, it creates 
some disciplinary problems in deployed units from lack of understanding among soldiers 
and even officers, affecting the social environment and physiological and moral strength 
of participants. Based on reality and experiences, the author recommends that the 
Mongolian military focus on deploying organic units to peace-support operations instead 
of sending units composed of personnel from different units. This will help to improve 
combat readiness, coherence, and training in those particular unit. Moreover, it will assist 
modernization of the force structure and command-and-control structures, spread 
expertise and experience throughout the military, and promote training for peace-support 
operations. Besides that, Mongolia needs to identify a way to increase the number of 
personnel in the mission area and international organization. This should include sending 
civilian police mentors, police units, and civilians in various political positions to mission 
headquarters and UN departments. 
In addition, the Mongolian military is required to establish a combined operation 
command or joint-operations center, responsible for command and control, planning, 
monitoring, evaluation of overseas operations and strategic and military leadership, with 
a range of options in making decisions. The MAF does not have a joint-operation 
doctrine or strategic guidance for newly established service commands.  
Another area that needs improvement is the development of the NCO corps, the 
foundation of every armed force on the globe. In recent years, the role and responsibility 
of Mongolia’s NCO corps has dramatically increased and its ability to perform tasks and 
missions is improving. If the military has not been properly trained or instructed to 
perform peace-support operations tasks and missions, then it might not be capable of 
performing them when actually participating in such. Mongolia should maintain and 
continue this crucial developmental track of NCO-corps development.  
Sixth, Mongolia is required to identify potential peace-support missions they 
could participate with in the future. Mongolia needs to analyze the future security 
environment and challenges, neighboring countries’ political environments, and its own 
policy regarding international peace and security, and then carefully choose which peace-
support operations to send its peacekeepers to. For instance, in 2009, Mongolia reached 
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an agreement with France to deploy peacekeepers to the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. 
However, this deployment has been cancelled because of Russian political pressure. 
Mongolia does not need to participate in all peace-support operations conducted around 
the world. Also, Mongolia needs to develop contingency plans for participating in future 
operations. 
Seventh, lack of knowledge on the rules of engagement, status of force 
agreements, and memoranda of understanding, and the absence of national rules of 
engagement, standard operating procedure, field manuals and guidelines, and insufficient 
legal experts and advisors within the military are generating problems associated with the 
capability development process and have contributed negatively to capability 
development. Furthermore, these affect participation in peace-support operations. To 
overcome this challenge, Mongolia needs to recruit or train lawyers and legal advisors 
and provide legal training for all military members to some degree, in order to develop 
clear, coherent, flexible, and realistic doctrines and procedures. 
Eight, adequate funding for modernization and peace-support-operations 
capability development effort is required for Mongolia and its military. Currently, 
Mongolia is spending 1.4% of its GDP for defense.123 The percentage of GDP spending 
on defense sounds like enough for maintaining and equipping the military in the current 
status; however, it is not sufficient for completing its modernization program. In recent 
years, the Mongolian defense budget has been increasing, but about 75% of the defense 
budget goes to day-to-day sustainment operations and maintenance of combat readiness; 
there is also a small amount of money for investment and acquisition of equipment. If the 
Mongolian armed forces want to acquire advanced military technologies and equipment, 
they need a big chunk of money. The Mongolian military needs to link the acquisition 
and budgeting systems to new concepts in order to provide capabilities essential to 
complete modernization and future military operations overseas. This system should be 
incorporated into the modernization or transformation process. In addition, compared to 
                                                 
123 CIA-The Wold Fact Book, available online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/, accessed April 12, 2012.  
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the foreign investment into the establishment of a peace-support-operations training 
center, Mongolia is investing too low and needs to increase its investment.  
Ninth, in order to achieve the desired end-state and fully implement its 
modernization program, Mongolia needs to develop good partnerships with other 
countries, including neighboring countries. For instance, Mongolia’s commitment to the 
global war on terrorism and participation in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars has increased 
Mongolia’s prestige in the eyes of the great powers, including the U.S., and has leveraged 
the relationship with these countries. This is the most influential argument for the 
implementation of the program.124 Mongolia needs to continue to strengthen and expand 
its existing military-to-military partnerships and bilateral, multinational security 
relationships with other countries in order to accelerate its peace-support operations 
capability development. Mongolia needs to carefully consider which partners to 
cooperate with. In the author’s view, Mongolia must maintain its non-alignment and 
neutrality policy, while closely cooperating with neighboring countries, NATO and its 
allies, and Northeast Asian militaries. 
Finally, to re-equip, upgrade, modernize, acquire and provide new technologically 
advanced weapons platforms and equipment and create sustainable logistical capacity for 
peacekeepers are crucial elements of a capability-development program. In the 
framework of this development program, Mongolia is required to develop a strategic 
communication and navigation system capability and an information and cyber-warfare 
capability in order to meet operational requirements. Recently, Mongolia’s government 
reached an agreement with Japan to develop and launch a navigation and communication 
satellite.125 Perhaps, this initiative could open opportunities for the Mongolian military in 
terms of acquiring new technology and developing a military navigation system or 
strategic communication capability. Mongolia needs to be innovative and adaptable when 
confronting capability gaps. Due to lack of funding, these programs will take several 
                                                 
124 Mendee Jargalsaikhan, Mongolia’s Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment and 
Evolution of Field Information Capabilities, 8. 
125 J.Bat-erdene, “Preparing Mongolian cosmologists and satellites”, Interview on UB Post, available 
online at: http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/index.php/others/88888954-othertop/7033-j-bat-erdene-preparing-
mongolian-cosmologists-and-satellites , accessed April 13, 2012. 
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years to develop. In Mongolia’s case, the defense budget for innovation and 
experimentation is not enough. Mongolia’s government and the Ministry of Defense 
should manage its defense budget plan accurately, spending wisely on this matter. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Today, the aim of Mongolia’s defense reform is focused on continuing 
participation in peace-support operations in much greater degree, while maintaining 
combat readiness and acquiring enough capacity to protect the homeland and counter 
military challenges. The progress of Mongolia’s military modernization has been slow 
and should increase in the near and mid-term.  
Mongolia continues to build more manageable and professional armed forces 
within its available resources. By the end of the implementation of the program, the MAF 
is expecting a significant improvement. Overall, MAF readiness and preparedness for 
combat and non-combat missions, peace-support operations, and counterterrorism 
capability, as well as its military training and education institution and welfare system, 
will improve.’ 
However, the MAF has a number of shortages. In spite of the fact that limitations 
on Mongolia’s economy, like an insufficient budget and funds, a lack of interagency 
coordination, a lack of professional military education that fully meets today’s 
requirement, an absence of clear strategic planning and vision, reliance on foreign 
military aid, and the political will which are the major difficulties for implementing these 
development programs. Mongolia’s military modernization is shaped by the military 
dimensions of the peace-support operations issue, and also by contextual and non-
contextual drivers, including Mongolia’s desire to maintain its survival, gain international 
prestige, create favorable conditions for economic development and military reform, and 
form defense policy. Military modernization of Mongolia is much more dependent on 
peace-support operations capabilities and training, education, and professionalization of 
officer and NCO corps than on an upgrade of weapon systems and equipment. The 
vulnerability of the current modernization program is dependence on foreign military 
assistances (China, Russia, U.S., etc.). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Mongolia’s commitment towards peace-support operations is recent, effective, 
and constructive. Its visible peacekeeping contribution began a decade ago. Today 
Mongolia is a notable troop-contributing nation to UN and NATO peace-support 
operations. To survive in a complicated geostrategic environment, Mongolia employs 
peacekeeping as a way to substantiate its third-neighbor policy with the EU and NATO 
members and increase its profile as a good, responsible member of the international 
community with real commitment. The military participation in peace-support operations 
plays constructive roles to consolidate democratic civilian control over the military, 
increase the military’s professionalism, and implement defense-reform policies. Unlike 
other developing nations, Mongolia does not view peace-support operations as a way to 
generate hard currency; rather it accepts it as a tool to demonstrate its independent 
foreign and defense policies. To corroborate this key argument, the thesis examines the 
changes in Mongolia’s national-security environment in the post–Cold War era, the 
developments of Mongolia’s growing contributions to peace-support operations, the 
factors that motivate Mongolia and its military, and the prospects for peace-support-
operations related activities. Importantly, the thesis presents policy recommendations for 
academic and policy community based on in-depth analyses of Mongolia’s commitment 
to peace-support operations. Mongolia’s lessons learned is applicable for many other 
small states that are struggling with transitional challenges.  
The significant changes that occurred after the collapse of the communist system 
have had a significant impact on Mongolia’s security environment and completely 
changed its view on national security and foreign policies. Mongolia needs to consider 
the global and regional geostrategic environment and broaden its approach to maintain 
favorable conditions for national security. Mongolia needs to pursue a balanced strategy 
that does not upset either China and Russia, because its security always depends on the 
behaviors of its two neighbors. At the same time, it is crucial that Mongolia continue 
balancing its relationship with other countries, particularly with Western powers and 
Northeast Asian countries. Mongolia’s new security environment in the post-communist 
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era has enabled and encouraged Mongolia to participate in peace-support operations. 
Through its active participation in peace-support operations, Mongolia is 
counterbalancing neighbors’ pressures and influences, thus making the peace-support 
operations an important foreign policy tool.  
To increase its international profile of a responsible member of the UN, Mongolia 
upholds the purposes and principles of the UN charter, especially the principles that are 
pertinent to peacekeeping. From the first deployment, the Mongolian armed forces have 
analyzed and reflected all the lessons learned and operational experiences for its ongoing 
and future operations. At the same time, the Mongolian government and its military are 
identifying and solving the challenges to developing sustainable peace-support 
capabilities for the UN and coalition peace-support operations.  
Besides its survival strategy in a tough neighborhood, the key factor behind 
Mongolia’s motivations is the country’s overall effort to raise its image, profile, and 
prestige in the international arena. To transform its military into a modern, capable, and 
professional force is another key factor. The MAF benefits from its participation in 
peace-support operations in terms of experience, training, education, and military-to-
military cooperation with other countries. The military is aware of its shortcomings, like 
limited capabilities, lack of personnel, poor operational language proficiency (i.e., 
English and French), operational and tactical training, and improper equipment. 
However, Mongolia looks to NATO as its model of a world-class military force and 
therefore, orients its reform efforts to achieving the level of new NATO members. To 
recap, Mongolia’s participation in peace-support operations is closely linked to its 
strategy of survival and elevates Mongolia’s international prestige to that of a responsible 
member, while its participation offers spin-off benefits for the Mongolian military as it 
moves forward. 
The ability to participate in peace-support operations largely depends on how the 
military accomplishes and implements modernization. Mongolian defense policies and 
concepts are generally directed to improving its defense capability and developing an 
appropriate and capable force structure. The progress of Mongolia’s military 
modernization has been slow and should increase in the near and mid-term. The 
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Mongolian military modernization plans seem to be implemented in some degree; 
however, deep reform is not being implemented. Adequate funding, highly educated 
civilian and military personnel, and sustainable capabilities are required for Mongolia in 
order to accelerate efforts in its military modernization. Mongolia’s participation in 
peace-support operations will influence any acceleration towards modernization and 
transformation of the military, identifying the vulnerabilities in old military planning, 
training, equipment, and acquisition processes that desperately require changes.  
The government of Mongolia has supported its military and formulated its 
defense policies based on peace-support capability development at every level. Mongolia 
has made all necessary changes within existing laws and adopted new laws, directions, 
guidelines, procedures, recommendations, orders and other documentation in this matter. 
Developing peace-support operations capabilities makes Mongolia more able to deploy 
full-size, sustainable battalions and brigade-size forces to peace-support operations in 
complex peacekeeping environment. If modernization and capability development are 
implemented as predicted, the Mongolian military could become “world-class” 
peacekeepers that operate more effectively with other multinational forces. Although 
Mongolia now has several plans for capability development, which are reflected in key 
national security statements as well as in each government’s action plans, in reality, 
Mongolia’s military modernization efforts much depends on foreign military assistance.  
Foreign military assistance is one of the most critical and influential factors for 
Mongolia’s peace-support capability development and modernization. Mongolia needs to 
continue and strengthen its military-to-military relationship with other countries, 
especially with the U.S., in order to get the necessary training and logistics assets to 
support its deployments and develop peace-support operations capability. Mongolia has 
used effectively and efficiently the limited foreign military assistance it has received to 
develop tactical capability; now Mongolia needs the foreign assistance to achieve much 
more strategic and operational levels of goals, for example, civil–military relations and in 
particular, defense-education reform.  
The Mongolian case is a classic example of healthy civil–military relations, 
characterized by a democratic civil–military decision-making process and effective 
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interagency collaboration between civilians and military institutions. Civilian and 
military institutions have closely cooperated and supported each other since Mongolia 
started its contribution to peace-support operations. The military has provided 
professional military advice to civilians in a decision-making level, and foreign policy 
and defense agencies have shared and exchanged information as well as educated each 
other in order to make decisions to participate in peace-support operations. Mechanisms 
are already in place between the foreign affairs and defense ministries to participate in 
peace-support operations, and there is no an argument about who will dominate in the 
policy decision-making process. To sustain healthy democratic, civil-military relations, 
Mongolia needs a system to educate civilian decision-makers and their staff at their 
civilian or defense institutions. Moreover, needs to fix gaps and overlaps that exist in 
relevant laws, regulations, and networks, between not only civilian and military 
institutions, but also among security institutions, and develop the national overarching 
strategy for peace-support operations at the level of the National Security Council. This 
process should not be led by parochial interests, but rather, it should be done in more 
scientific and pragmatic manner.  
The Mongolian Armed Forces personnel have gained tremendous experience and 
knowledge since their participation in peace-support operations. However, the Mongolian 
military have not fully integrated and circulated all this knowledge and experience into 
the military training and education institutions. The National Defense University of 
Mongolia and other military educational institutions are required to modify and adjust 
their educational and training programs to meet today’s requirements and the need to 
recruit experienced, knowledgeable, and trained academics and scholars. The education 
system changes will take time to develop because the foundation of the current military 
education system is still based on Soviet-style military education, especially at the 
National Defense University. Without changing it, the Mongolian military cannot achieve 
its desired end-state and objectives of pursuing education and training capability 
development. However, quite later in 2010, Mongolian civilian and military leaders 
realized the importance of the defense educational institutions for developing civilian 
defense experts and military professionals to lead and implement military modernization 
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goals, which basically revolve around Mongolia’s ambition to provide soldiers for peace-
support operations. Since adjustments to increase research, educational, and training 
capabilities of the National Defense University for peace-support operations were limited 
in 2010, it would be risky to predict the results. But Mongolia presents useful lessons for 
others who are embarking on global peacekeeping ambitions—the sustained participation 
in peacekeeping operations could be challenged if the defense educational institutions are 
not on board. The defense educational institutions should serve as the main source of 
research, education, and training to expose civilian and military professionals to a 
systemic understanding of peace-support operations.  
Recently, the military played a dominant role in Mongolia’s commitment to 
peace-support operations. However, in order to gain support from the public and 
politicians and increase efficiency in peace-support operations, Mongolia needs to 
diversify its commitment further by including uniformed personnel from other security 
institutions: border troops, internal troops, emergency forces, intelligence, and police. 
Mongolia needs to change its policy and incorporate civilians and civilian police 
personnel in peace-support operations. This will help increase its commitment. Also, this 
policy will increase the niche capabilities of the Mongolian security forces for more 
complex peace-support operations, because all players will bring a unique set of 
capabilities, skills, and knowledge. At the same time, these diversified deployments will 
increase the interagency cooperation and interoperability of Mongolian security forces as 
well as civilians. Mongolia seeks new approaches and ways in its commitment to peace-
support operations without a well-prepared and good road map. 
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